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STATEMENT OF
 J U R I S D I C T I Q N 
This Court has jurisdiction ova I . IMI.IIII IM "i 'i.ui Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(| i kxausi: tin- \ »is«- \\ a •; iraiisferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. See . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Supreme Court's junMJ^non arose out ol I l"i il 
Ann § 78-2-2f3)(j). i^iic^ .lit-, appeal is • nt of a court of 
record ov ive original appellate jurisdiction. See UTAH CODE 
ANN I 78-2-2(3Ml) ': • ••'..- ' .. ' '•. 
I S S U E S Q N A p p E A L 
Issue #1: Statutory Damages der the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices 4 ct 
A, Statement of the Issue, Whether statutory damages and iitl-iincy fit's mn\ be 
awarded In I'Linfifi uiulri Ihi 1 Ifah Consumer Sales Practices Act where 
^
 rendants (1) "clearly engaged in fraud" against Plaintiff by altering the 
of a contract they executed \\ nil f'tiiiiiiii, (j | puisucd ntigain 
Plaintiff to colic - "Vaudulently-altered contract, and 
(3) filed a negative statement on Plaintiffs credit repon. hut Plaintiff cannot 
quantify the actual damages he has incunu, ^ *. u - .. ^ \ dam i- h 
B. Standard oi Kanv Hx:itu\i: "IMainlif'fs challenge only the district court's 
inti., i'[)i"ii.il IIH- u i . . . me UCSPA and the district court's legal conclusion^]" 
regarding that Act, appellate courts "grant no particular deu- . 
district courts ruin ,_
 v, 
-A/w ^  M)6K 'et uLu Holmes v. Am. States Im OA, 
2000 UT App 85 at f 9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (reviewing summary judgment 
dismissal of UCSPA claim under same standard). 
C. Preservation at the Trial Court. [R. at 283-85; 394-408]. 
Issue #2; Res Judicata of Previously-Litigated Fraud and UCSPA Claims 
A. Statement of Issue. Whether, under the principle ofres judicata, the district 
court should have granted summary judgment against Defendants on causes 
of action for fraud and a violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
when, in a previous action litigated between the same parties or their privies, 
and following a full trial on the merits, the court entered a final order holding 
that Defendants had "clearly engaged in fraud" in altering the terms of the 
parties' contract. 
B. Standard of Review. Because the issue is purely legal, and Plaintiff appeals 
an order granting and denying motions for summary judgment, the standard 
of review is de novo. See Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 
^}13,70P.3d35. 
C. Preservation at the Trial Court. [R. at 114-16; 120-133]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales 
practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent 
2 
with the policies of the Federal Trade Commissi • w ,.,.:.; .. 
consumer protection 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative nuea. ^dh 
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar 
laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protcii '.iippliers who in good faith comply with the 
provisions of this act. 
Utah Code Ann, § 13 * * * Definitions 
As used HI fins chapici: 
(2) (a) \ -nsumer transaction'' mains a sale, lease,, assignment, award by 
chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or 
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and. 
insurance) to, or apparently to, a person for: 
(i) primarily personal, family, or household purposes; or 
(ii) purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires: 
(A) expenditure of money or proper? v m the person described in 
Subsection (2)(a); and 
(B) the person described in Subsection {2){'&) to perform personal 
services on a continuing basis and in which the person described in 
Subsection (2)(a) has not been previously engaged, 
(b) "Consumer transaction55 includes: 
(i) any of the following with respect to a transfer or disposition 
described in Subsection (2)(a): 
i A J n offer; 
(B f a solicitation; 
(C) an agreement; or 
(D) performance of an agu 
rv - 3 charitable solicitation. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, 
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, association, cooperative, or any other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other 
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer 
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4(2). Deceptive act or practice by supplier 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a 
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied 
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously 
been agreed to by the consumer . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2), (5). Actions by consumer 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $ 2,000, 
whichever is greater, plus court costs. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may 
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work 
reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this 
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a 
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or 
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-1 l-21(l)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. Mr. Andreason agreed to purchase a membership at Gold's Gym 
on the condition that his membership be month-to-month, not a full year's agreement, and 
executed a Membership Agreement (the "Agreement") to that effect. [R. at 91]. When his 
wife became ill after five months' use of Gold's Gym's facilities, Mr. Andreason sought to 
terminate his membership, but Gold's Gym insisted that Mr. Andreason pay a full one-year 
amount. [R. at 88-89]. Gold's Gym filed a negative statement on Mr. Andreason's credit 
report and prosecuted a collection action against Mr. Andreason. [R. at 87-88]. 
ThQ collection action proceeded to trial [P at 86"! A? the trial. ^ 
action, both Mr. Andreason and counsel loi L-n
 :; ... , . examined 
witnesses and • agreement into evidence. [11. at 85-86]. The 
disf r'li court, examined Mr. Andreason's copy of his membership contract and compared it 
with the cupy of the 'Ymver.ient offered into e> KICI^ V : -
district court lui^; >.. mib ol me contract aita Mr 
.'"UKJicis • • '* u* '.-*™ ^Li^k ruidcrcd the auKcmenl a full one-year cont-°r* 
|R. at 72, 851. 1 lie court held that the contract entered into evklena.11 in t inltl s i .yni, ,,l,„i,:ti 
"clearly fraud by Gold's""1 and thai """fiol<l.( : (iym engaged in fraud" against Mr. Andreason 
r • acuon. [II. at 72,85]. Subseijn ' \ndreason filed a 
complaint against Defendants alleging, inter alia, causes of 
of the Utah Consumer Sales PiaciiujM . tu |n .I
 t .. 
2 i miii'si " • «- *'ii*|i||iis "M (he district court level in this case, Mr, Andreason filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on liability based on the doctrine of res judicata. 
[R at 114-16; 120-133], After discovery, Defendant, innved lur summaiy judgment on 
all in i\|ii Midri ii'-oii1" cl'iini \\! ;i( 257-267]. Mr. Andreason cross-moved for 
summary judgment as to his fraud and UCSPA claims. [R. at 282-408]. 
3. Disposition in the District Cow treasons 
Muiion ior ljnf i" il Siiiiiiii-i" , hid a Liability based on the Doctrine oi H. 
Judicata, [R. at 158-011 i ,itn ihe district court denied Mr, Andreason's motion for 
summary judgment as to his .fraud and li(.'SPA claims and granled I Vlendaiii •' I \1« l i o n 
foi Summary Judgmein, dMH^smy Ihe ai. IIOII w it\ entirely [R. at 547-51]. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL1 
1. At the time of the events at issue herein, Defendants Scott Felsted, Dean Viertel, 
and Troy Peterson were the owners of Defendant Gold's Gym of Provo. [R. at 
406 HI, 464 HI]. 
2. Defendant Gold's Gym of Provo is a d/b/a of Defendant Body Firm Aerobics, Inc. 
[R. at 405 H 2, 464 H 1] (Defendants will hereinafter collectively be referred to as 
"Gold's Gym"). 
3. On or about October 11, 1999. Andreason entered into a "Membership 
Agreement" with Gold's Gym to use the Gold's Gym weight training facilities in 
Provo (the "Agreement"). [R. at 405 f 4, 390-9112].2 
4. Before signing the Agreement with Gold's Gym, Mr. Andreason explained to a 
Gold's Gym representative, who identified himself only as "Pat," that he was not 
interested in a full-year membership commitment. Mr. Andreason believes that 
Pat represented to Mr. Andreason that the Agreement was for a month-to-month 
term, cancelable on thirty days notices. [R. at 405 ^  5; 390-91 fflf 2-3]. Gold's 
Gym has admitted that its employee, Pat Baum, had discussions and/or dealings 
with Mr. Andreason regarding the Agreement. [R. at 312-13]. Gold's Gym 
asserts that its employees have never offered a month-to-month contract. [R. at 
464 ^ } 2]. However, Gold's Gym does not assert that it has personal knowledge of 
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all statements of fact herein are undisputed by the parties, as set 
forth in the parties' summary judgment memoranda and appendices cited herein. 
2
 Gold's Gym did not oppose or dispute this statement in responding to Mr. Andreason's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 464]. 
the negotiations between Mr. Andreason and Pat Baum prior to the execution of 
the Agreement, nor does it provide an affidavit from Mr. Baum regarding the 
same. [R. at 464^2]. 
5. After Mr. Andreason received his copy of the Agreement, Gold's Gym or its 
agents, employees, or representatives added additional information to the white 
and pink copies of the Agreement. [R. at 405 ^  6, 390 U 4, 464 % 1]. 
6. Gold's Gym has admitted that at least one of their employees was responsible for 
the changes and additions to its version of the Agreement. [R. at 404-05 ^ 7, 464 ^ 
1]. 
7. The information that was added to Mr. Andreason's version of the Agreement 
after Mr. Andreason signed the Agreement included an ending date to the 
Agreement twelve months after the date the Agreement was executed. Gold's 
Gym also admits that other terms were added or changed on their version of the 
Agreement. [R. at 40418, 464 f 1] 
8. Gold's Gym admits that the effect of these alterations was to increase the length of 
the commitment purportedly agreed to by Mr. Andreason from a month-to-month 
to a full-year commitment. [R. at 404 f 9, 464 f 1]. 
9. After using and paying for the facilities at Gold's Gym for about five months, Mr. 
Andreason's wife became ill, and Mr. Andreason decided to terminate his 
membership with Gold's Gym. Mr. Andreason gave Gold's Gym thirty days' 
notice of his termination. However, Mr. Andreason was informed that he could 
7 
not terminate his membership until he had been a member for a full year. [R. at 
404 If 10, 464 If 1]. 
10. Gold's Gym further admits that it then attempted to force Mr. Andreason to pay 
for an additional seven months of membership at Gold's Gym. [R. at 404 ^ [ 11, 
390 f 6, 464 f 3]. 
11. In or about October, 2000, Gold's Gym contracted with AFS, Inc., a debt 
collection agency ("AFS"), to try to recover the remaining payments under the 
terms of the altered Agreement on behalf of Gold's Gym [R. at 403 112, 389 U 8, 
464 If 1]. 
12. On June 14, 2001, Mr. Andreason was served with a summons and complaint 
brought by AFS. In its complaint, AFS sought payment of $182.21, plus court 
costs and attorney fees. This complaint was solely based on Gold's Gym's version 
of the Agreement, which had been altered by Gold's Gym to state that Mr. 
Andreason had agreed to a full-year membership, when he had only agreed to a 
month-to-month membership. [R. at 403 If 14, 3891 9, 464 f 1]. 
13. On November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m., a trial was conducted before the Honorable 
Claudia Laycock in the matter styled AFS v. Rod Andreason Civ. No. 
A010403063DC (the "Trial"). [R. at 403 115, 389110, 464 f 1]. At the Trial, 
both sides examined witnesses and entered evidence into the record. [R. at 85-6]. 
14. At the conclusion of the Trial on November 2, 2001, Judge Laycock entered an 
order, drafted by AFS's counsel, which made the following specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law: 
The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is different than 
Defendant's copy and is clearly fraud by Golds. 
Neither contract is compliant with the Truth in Lending requirements. 
Based upon the findings, the court makes the ruling that Golds Gym 
engaged in Fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant [Mr. 
Andreason]. 
[R. at 72 (emphasis added), 402-03 f 17, 389 If 11,464 J 1]. 
15. Based upon these findings, the Court found in favor of Mr. Andreason and 
dismissed the collection action against Mr. Andreason. [R. at 72, 402 % 18, 389 f 
11,4641|1]. 
16.Neither AFS nor Gold's Gym has appealed this ruling. [R. at 402 % 19, 464 f 1]. 
17. It is unknown how many other persons have executed similar "Membership 
Agreements" with Gold's Gym and suffered the same fraudulent actions by Gold's 
Gym; Gold's Gym only asserts that Pat Baum, the employee who executed the 
Agreement with Mr. Andreason, was terminated and "all contracts that were in 
any collection process that he had written were removed to avoid this situation in 
the future." [R. at 287 % 12]. 
18. In addition, when he was sued by AFS, Mr. Andreason was forced to devote 
considerable amounts of time preparing for and defending himself at Trial, 
including time and effort that he was then unable to devote to his employment. 
[R. at 402 f 25, 388 ^  15, 465 % 9 (disputing only that such efforts are 
compensable damages)]. 
19. Gold's Gym has admitted that at some point during this dispute, it or AFS placed a 
negative statement of debt owing on Mr. Andreason's credit report with one or 
9 
more credit reporting agencies. [R. at 287-88 f^ 10]. It is unknown on what date 
this negative credit report was removed. 
20. Mr. Andreason believes that he was forced to pay higher rates of interest on credit 
cards and the home mortgage he obtained as a result of Gold's Gym or AFS 
placing a negative statement on his credit report with one or more credit reporting 
agencies. [R. at 402 f 23, 388 1f 15, 388 113, 465 1f 8 (disputing only the 
existence of proof of such damages)]. 
21. On or about February 2, 2002, Mr. Andreason filed the instant action against 
Gold's Gym asserting, inter alia, claims for fraud and a violation of the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA"). [R. at 1-20]. 
22. On or about July 31, 2002, Mr. Andreason filed a motion for summary judgment 
on his fraud and UCSPA claims based on the doctrine ofres judicata. [R. at 114-
33]. The district court determined that AFS was Gold's Gym's privy, but denied 
that motion because it held that the prior court had not addressed the other 
elements of fraud or the UCSPA. [R. at 159-61]. 
23. In or about March, 2003, Mr. Andreason and Gold's Gym filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. [R. at 257-270, 282-408]. The district court held that Gold's 
Gym's actions were fraudulent and violated the UCSPA (§ 13-11-4(1)). [R. at 550 
fflf 8-9]. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gold's 
Gym and against Mr. Andreason because: (1) Mr. Andreason could not prove that 
higher interest rates in his credit cards or home mortgage were due to Gold's 
Gym's actions [R. at 548-49 1flj 15-22]; (2) the district court held that time spent 
i n 
by Mr. Andreason defending himself at trial is not compensable damage [R. at 548 
If 24]; and (3) statutory damages are impermissible under the UCSPA (§ 13-11-
19(2)) unless the claimant first establishes actual damages, which the court held 
that Mr. Andreason had failed to do [R. at 548 ffl[ 25-26, 30]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court held that Gold's Gym's actions in altering its Agreement with 
Mr. Andreason and then suing him for extra monies under the altered Agreement were 
fraudulent and violated the UCSPA, but nevertheless refused to grant Mr. Andreason 
summary judgment on his USCPA claim and award statutory damages because Mr. 
Andreason could not prove actual damages. However, the UCSPA provides for statutory 
damages in lieu of actual damages. In fact, the entire purpose of statutory damages is to 
provide some compensation to lawbreakers when actual damages are minimal or difficult 
to calculate. In addition, wrongdoers such as Gold's Gym should not be benefited by 
difficulty in calculating damages—particularly when they are the cause of such difficulty. 
The purpose and stated liberal construction of the UCSPA militate in favor of such an 
award. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order of the district court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Gold's Gym and against Mr. Andreason on his UCSPA 
claim. 
At the Trial of Gold's Gym's collection action (via a collection agency) against 
Mr. Andreason—based on the fraudulently altered Agreement—the Trial court found that 
Gold's Gym's copy of the Agreement had been altered and was clearly fraud by Gold's 
Gym. This finding of fraud was between the parties or their privies in this case, is 
11 
identical to the fraud claim filed in this case, permitted Gold's Gym the full opportunities 
of due process, and resulted in an adjudication on the merits. A violation of the UCSPA 
was also encompassed within the Trial court's findings and Gold's Gym's admissions. 
Thus, this Court should reverse the order of the district court in this case that denied Mr. 
Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. ANDREASON'S 
UCSPA CLAIM BECAUSE MR. ANDREASON WAS ENTITLED TO 
STATUTORY DAMAGES IN LIEU OF ACTUAL DAMAGES 
The district court held that Gold's Gym's actions were fraudulent and violated the 
UCSPA. [R. at 5501fl[ 8-9]. Nevertheless, the court granted Gold's Gym's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Andreason's UCSPA claim on one ground: that 
because Mr. Andreason did not prove actual damages, he is not entitled to relief under the 
UCSPA. [R. at 548 ffif 25-26, 30]. However, the UCSPA provides for statutory damages 
in lieu of actual damages. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2). In fact, the entire reason 
for statutory damages is to compensate persons harmed by the actions of others where the 
amount of damages is difficult to ascertain. Gold's Gym should not be benefited by the 
difficulty of proof, particularly since it actually harmed Mr. Andreason and partly caused 
such difficulty. Accordingly, the district court's order dismissing Mr. Andreason's 
UCSPA claim should be reversed. 
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A. Standard of Review 
When "Plaintiffs challenge only the district court's interpretation of... the 
UCSPA and the district court's legal conclusion^]" regarding that Act, appellate courts 
"grant no particular deference to the district court's rulings but review them for 
correctness." Poulsen v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996); see also Holmes v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85 at ^  9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing 
summary judgment dismissal of UCSPA claim under same standard). 
B. Statutory Damages May be Awarded Absent Proof of Actual Damages 
Under the UCSPA 
1. Statutory Damages are an Alternative Under the UCSPA 
The UCSPA provides for statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2) states: "A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000, 
whichever is greater, plus court costs." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2). Hence, either 
actual or statutory damages are available to consumers who suffer loss as a result of a 
UCSPA violation. Although not defined in the statute, "loss" is considered "a generic 
and relative term not a word of limited, hard and fast meaning and has been held 
synonymous with, or equivalent to 'damage', 'damages', 'deprivation', 'detriment', 
'injury', and 'privation.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 1979); see also 
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d Ed. 1969) ("The word is not one of limited, 
hard and fast meaning. There are many kinds of loss, besides money out of pocket. No 
man would doubt that he might rightly call a Moss' that event which changed his status 
from solvency to insolvency.") Accordingly, pursuant to § 13-11-19(2), one who suffers 
"damage, deprivation, detriment, injury, or privation" from a UCSPA violator may 
recover either actual damages or statutory damages, whichever is greater. 
In this case, Mr. Andreason has plainly suffered "damage, deprivation, detriment, 
injury, or privation" due to Gold's Gym's acts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th 
Ed. 1979). As a result of Gold's Gym's fraudulent alteration of the Agreement, Mr. 
Andreason was sued by Gold's Gym and compelled to respond to the complaint and 
defend himself at trial. [R. at 402 ^  25, 388 1f 15]. In so responding, Mr. Andreason 
incurred litigation costs and was absent from his employment. [Id.]. Most importantly, 
Gold's Gym admits that it filed a negative statement on Mr. Andreason's credit report. 
[R. at 287-88 ^  10]. This negative statement damaged Mr. Andreason's credit, and may 
have increased the interest rates Mr. Andreason was required to pay for a second 
mortgage and credit cards Mr. Andreason obtained. [R. at 402 123, 388 1f 15, 388 If 13]. 
While a direct correlation between Gold's Gym's filing of the negative credit statement 
and increases in Mr. Andreason's interest rates was not proven on summary judgment, 
this was due at least in part to Gold's Gym's purported inability to identify when it filed 
the negative credit statement [R. at 508-09]. In any event, the difficulty in calculating 
damages does not alter the fact that Mr. Andreason suffered "damage, deprivation, 
detriment, injury, or privation" due to Gold's Gym's unlawful acts. 
2. Wrongdoers Should Not Be Benefited By a Difficulty in 
Calculating Damages 
Moreover, Gold's Gym should not be absolved of its fraud because of the 
difficulty of proving the damage it caused. It is a frequent maxim in Utah courts that: 
"The fact that it is difficult to calculate damages will not prevent an injured party from 
recovery." Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co. ,504 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1972); see 
also Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah 1998) (citing 
Monter); Atkin Wright & Miles v. The Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 
(Utah 1985). "It is, after all, the wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should 
bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages." Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336. 
In this case, the district court agreed that Gold's Gym violated the UCSPA [R. at 
550 Yi 8-9]. Gold's Gym fraudulently altered its contract with Mr. Andreason and then 
sued Mr. Andreason to enforce the contract under the altered terms. [R. at 404-05 <|ffl 6-9, 
390 ^ f 4,464 U 1]. It is unknown how many other persons have suffered the same harm at 
Gold's Gym's hands; Gold's Gym only asserts that the employee who executed the 
Agreement with Mr. Andreason was terminated and "all contracts that were in any 
collection process that he had written were removed to avoid this situation in the future." 
[R. at 287 f 12]. However, it is clear that Mr. Andreason was so harmed, and Gold's 
Gym should not evade responsibility simply by the difficulty of proof. 
In particular, Gold's Gym should not be absolved of its fraud due to the difficulty 
in proving damages when it has been the cause of such difficulty. This is one of the 
purposes of statutory damages. For example, under federal trademark law, statutory 
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damages are provided as an alternate remedy for this reason. "Congress provided the 
statutory damages option . . . due to the concern that a counterfeiter might hide, alter or 
destroy records, thus making it impossible for a plaintiff to determine the actual scope of, 
or be able to prove, actual damages." Lorillard Tobacco Co, v. S&M Cent. Serv., 2004 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 22563 at *9 (N.D. 111. Nov. 8, 2004). 
In this case, Gold's Gym admits that it filed a negative statement on Mr. 
Andreason's credit report. [R. at 287-88 ^ 10]. However, it does not identify—or appear 
to know—when it filed that statement. Hence, when Mr. Andreason attempted to assess 
the damages caused by Gold's Gym's unlawful actions, he was unable to do so because 
he could not ascertain what negative credit actions were caused by Gold's Gym's 
negative credit statement. [R. at 508-09]. This court should not allow Gold's Gym to 
evade the consequences of its fraud by failing to locate—or potentially hiding or 
destroying—records of its wrongdoing. 
3. Statutory Damages Are Often Awarded When Actual Damages 
Are Minimal Or Difficult to Prove 
Furthermore, the main purpose of statutory damages3 is to provide plaintiffs with 
at least some compensation when actual damages are difficult to prove. Federal courts 
3
 Other purposes of statutory damages that are applicable here include providing 
wrongdoers with an incentive to obey the law, see Strange v. Wexler, 796 F. Supp. 1117, 
1120 (N.D. 111. 1992) ("One purpose of statutory damages is to create an incentive to 
obey the law."); discouraging wrongful conduct, see Alentino v. Chenson Enters., 938 
F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the purpose of statutory damages is also "to 
discourage wrongful conduct") (quoting Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 233); and encouraging 
consumers to act as "private attorneys general," see Scrimgeour, 149 F.3d at 327 n.l 1 
(statutory damages created "[i]n order to encourage [plaintiffs] to act as 'private attorneys 
general'"); Romero-Vargas v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1995) ("One 
1£ 
have frequently held that "the purpose of statutory damages is to remedy a wrong which 
would otherwise go unremedied if actual damages could not be proven." Raydiola Music 
v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1990); see also Scrimgeour v. 
IRS, 149 F.3d 318, 327 n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that statutory damages were 
available, in part, because "[a]ctual damages . . . can be hard to quantify"); Barber v. 
KimbrelVs, Inc. 577 F.2d 216, 222 n.14 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Recognizing that it is difficult 
for a consumer to prove actual monetary damages . . . , Congress imposed a civil penalty 
('statutory damages') for non-compliance . .. ."); Marshall v. Music Hall Cent, 1995 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 17904 at *9 n.8, Case No. 95-CV-70910 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 1995) 
('The purpose of statutory damages is to allow relief... where the calculation of actual 
damages . . . is too difficult or would be unfair."). 
Hence, statutory damages are often awarded even if no actual damages are proven 
or even alleged. See, e.g., Fenn v. MLeads, Enters., Inc., 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah 
Adv. 37 (plaintiff only pleaded and was awarded $10 in statutory damages); F. W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 230 (1952) (recognizing that 
the trial judge could exclude damages testimony "on the ground that authority to allow 
statutory damages rendered proof of actual damages unnecessary"); Baker v. G.C. Servs. 
Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982) (awarding statutory damages when no actual 
purpose of the statutory damages of $1,000 is to provide an incentive for individuals who 
have minimal damages to sue, thereby encouraging the widest possible citizen 
enforcement through the judicial process.") (citation omitted). 
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damages had been shown); Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D. 
Ore. 1981) ("A plaintiff need not show actual pecuniary damages in order for the court to 
award statutory damages."); Woolfolkv., Rubin, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20964, Case No. 
N-88-266 (EBB) (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 1990) ("Moreover, several courts have found that 
actual damages need not be proven before statutory damages can be awarded.9'). 
It is unknown to what extent Mr. Andreason suffered due to Gold's Gym's 
actions. However, even if the harm Mr. Andreason suffered was relatively minor, the 
Utah Legislature has determined that a violation of the UCSPA warrants a unique cause 
of action, statutory damages, and attorney fees. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19. As 
this Court has previously held, "[W]e will not second-guess the legislature's 
determination that this injury is far from trivial, but rather, serious enough to warrant a 
cause of action that awards attorney fees as well as statutory damages." Weaver v. 
DirectLink Media Group, LLC, No. 20030947-CA, 2004 UT App 471 n. 2004, Utah App. 
Lexis 524 (Dec. 16, 2004) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of a cause of action under 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 when defendants sent only one unsolicited email in 
violation of that law). 
4. The Legislature Has Mandated A Liberal Construction of The 
UCSPA To Protect Consumers 
Furthermore, the Legislature has stated that the UCSPA "shall be construed 
liberally . . . to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(2). The Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed that "the legislature has mandated a liberal construction of the Act." 
Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1015 (Utah 1991); see also State by Wilkinson v. B & H 
Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D. Utah 1988) ("The Act is to be construed liberally 'to 
protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales 
practices . . . . " ) ; Holmes v. Am. States Ins., 2000 UT App 85 at ] 20, 1 P.3d 552 ("The 
central purpose of the Sales Practices Act is 'to protect consumers from suppliers who 
commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.5") (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 
13-11-2(2)). 
Accordingly, federal and state courts have extended the application of the UCSPA 
beyond its plain terms to ensure such consumer protection. See Wade, 818 P.2d at 1015 
(applying the UCSPA to residential leases, although such are not specified in the Act); 
State by Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. at 204 ("To interpret 'supplier' narrowly to include only 
those in privity with the consumer would defeat the clear purpose of the Act, and could 
not have been intended by the Utah legislature."). 
In this case, Gold's Gym has plainly committed a deceptive and unconscionable 
sales practice. Gold's Gym's actions were egregious, "clearly fraud," and worthy of 
UCSPA policies. Failing to provide at least statutory damages would utterly frustrate the 
clear legislative intent of the Act. Therefore, Mr. Andreason requests that this Court 
reverse the order of the district court granting summary judgment against Mr. Andreason 
and in favor of Gold's Gym regarding Mr. Andreason's UCSPA claim and order that Mr. 
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Andreason is entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees4 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§13-11-19(2). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. ANDREASON'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICA TA 
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability Under the Doctrine of 
Res Judicata, Mr. Andreason set forth undisputed material facts establishing that under 
that doctrine, Gold's Gym was liable to Mr. Andreason for fraud and a violation of the 
UCSPA. [R. at 130-32]. In its responsive memorandum, Gold's Gym did not present 
any disputed facts regarding Mr. Andreason's Motion. [R. at 140]. Nevertheless, the 
district court denied Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. at 160-
61]. Because the district court's ruling on summary judgment was in error, this Court 
should reverse that decision. 
A. Standard of Review 
"On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review the trial court's legal 
conclusions for correctness and grant them no deference." Holmes v. Am. States Ins. Co., 
2000 UT App. 85, t 9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Petersen v. Salt 
Lake City, 1999 UT 93, \ 2, 987 P.2d 57 (Utah 1999)). 
The standard for summary judgment is well-known, but bears repeating in this 
context: 
4
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(5), Mr. Andreason also seeks an award of his 
attorney fees for the time during which he was represented by counsel, in an amount to be 
determined by the district court. 
on 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). To establish a "genuine issue as to any material 
fact," the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (which were in effect at that date)5 first 
required that Gold's Gym respond to the motion for summary judgment by showing the 
existence of a "genuine issue," in the following manner: 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue of fact exists followed 
by a concise statement of material facts which support the party's 
contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference 
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(B) (emphasis added). In addition, under Rule 56, Gold's 
Gym was required to go beyond "mere allegations" to avoid summary judgment: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but in response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
5
 This Rule has since been incorporated into the current Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7. 
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genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
B. Gold's Gym Presented No Genuine Dispute as to Any Material Fact 
In responding to Mr. Andreason's Motion for Summary Judgment, Gold's Gym 
failed to present any "genuine issue as to any material fact" regarding Mr. Andreason's 
claims. 
In its Memo in Opposition, Gold's Gym admitted all facts necessary for summary 
judgment; indeed, Gold's Gym admitted every fact presented by Mr. Andreason except 
for the contents of an excerpt from the prior trial's transcript. [R. at 140]. However, 
even without the trial transcript—which merely supplements the Court's Order—Gold's 
Gym admitted that "Gold's Gym engaged in fraud," and that the altering of the contract 
was "clearly fraud by Gold's Gym." [Id] The manner in which such fraud was executed 
and the action of AFS "on behalf of Defendants" are also undisputed. [Id.] 
Furthermore, in its Memo in Opposition, Gold's Gym did not present "a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention." UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 
4. In addition, Gold's Gym did not "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(e). Gold's Gym presented no disputed facts 
whatsoever. Instead, Gold's Gym "rest[ed] upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] 
pleading." Id. These allegations are unsupported by any evidence, rule, statute, or 
judicial determinations. Thus summary judgment should have been entered against 
Gold's Gym. 
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This result springs not merely from a technical violation of procedural rules. 
Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, the granting of a summary judgment "serves 
the salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial" that would 
otherwise be unnecessarily incurred. McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, there would be no purpose in proceeding through the time and expense of 
trial, given the clear and undisputed facts before the Court. 
C. Under Res Judicata, Mr. Andreason is Entitled to Judgment as a 
Matter of Law on His Fraud and UCSPA Claims 
It is undisputed that the trial court, after a full trial on the merits where Gold's 
Gym was represented by counsel, made a factual finding and legal ruling that that "Golds 
Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr. 
Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72 
(emphasis added), 402-03 % 17, 389111, 464 f 1]. This finding that Gold's Gym 
"engaged in fraud" against Mr. Andreason was an issue that was actually litigated at trial 
and was essential to the determination of a valid and final judgment between the parties. 
[Id.]. Gold's Gym did not appeal this judgment. [R. at 402 % 19, 464 U 1]. Therefore, 
based on the res judicata principle of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, Gold's Gym 
is precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Gold's Gym committed fraud against 
Andreason. Mr. Andreason's claims for Fraud and a violation of the UCSPA are both 
based on the findings and conclusions made by the district court at Trial on fraud in the 
previous adjudication. [R. at 80-86]. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr. 
Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 
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and judgment should have been entered against Gold's Gym as to Gold's Gym's liability 
for Fraud and a Violation of the UCSPA. 
1. The Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Prohibits the Parties From 
Relitigating The Issue of Gold's Gym's Liability For Fraud 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, res judicata refers to the overall doctrine of 
the preclusive effects to be given to prior court judgments. See In re Gen. Determination 
of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 70 (Utah 1999). "Included within the doctrine 
of res judicata is the law of'issue preclusion' also known as 'collateral estoppel.'" Id. 
Specifically, issue preclusion arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties 
or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit. See Maoris & Assocs. Inc. v. Neways, Inc. 16 P.3d 1214, 1221 
(Utah 2000); see also Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that where plaintiffs claims have been once defeated, plaintiff may not thereafter assert 
the same claims against different defendants). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
four elements comprise issue preclusion: 
1. The party against whom preclusion is asserted must have been a party to 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; 
2. The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; 
3. The issue in the first action must have been completely, fairly, and fully 
litigated; and 
4. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70; see also Searle 
Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). All four parts of this test are clearly met 
in this case. 
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a. Gold's Gym Was a Party to or in Privity With AFS, a 
Party to the Prior Adjudication. 
First, as the district court in this case acknowledged in its ruling [R. at 160], 
Gold's Gym was clearly "party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." In 
re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70. Gold's Gym 
specifically directed AFS to take legal action to recover amounts owed under the 
Contract to Gold's Gym. [R. at 403 \ 12, 389 If 8, 464 \ 1]. Gold's Gym was the real 
party in interest: it merely directed AFS to recover amounts under the Agreement that it 
claimed were owed to it. [Id]. Tellingly, in the Order of Dismissal drafted by AFS, the 
district court referred to the "contract entered into evidence by Gold's Gym"—not AFS. 
[R. at 72]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that res judicata binds "one whose interest has 
been legally represented at the time." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 
1978). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court observed in Souffront v. Compagnie 
des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 486 (1910) that the persons for whose benefit and at whose 
direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be the strangers to the cause: 
"who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect his own 
right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of 
his own... is as much bound... as he would be if he had been a party to the record." 
In this case, the interests of Gold's Gym were represented in the earlier litigation. 
All of Gold's Gym's interests were aligned with those of AFS in that matter, i.e., to 
recover money from Mr. Andreason. Moreover, Gold's Gym stood to gain by the fraud 
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that was committed against Mr. Andreason through the alteration of the Agreement to 
change its terms and bind Mr. Andreason to a commitment that he had not agreed to. 
Therefore, Gold's Gym were effectively parties to the prior litigation. 
Finally, the district court specifically directed its factual findings and ultimate 
ruling to Gold's Gym, not AFS. At trial, the district court declared that "Golds Gym 
engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr. Andreason 
received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72, 402-03 Tf 17, 
389 f^ 11, 464 1f 1]. Therefore, it is clear that Gold's Gym was the real party in interest, or 
at the very least in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. 
b. The issue Decided In The Prior Adjudication—Gold's 
Gym's Fraud—Is Identical To The Fraud Claim In This 
Action And Encompasses The Claim For Violation of The 
UCSPA 
Second, the fraud issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the current 
Fraud claim and encompasses the claim for a violation of the UCSPA asserted in this 
case. 
i. MR. ANDREASON'S FRAUD CLAIM 
In the prior adjudication, the district court at Trial specifically held that "Golds 
Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr. 
Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72, 
402-03 117, 389 ^ 11, 464 f 1]. The court at Trial further held: "Based on the findings, 
the Court makes the ruling that Golds Gym engaged in fraud and therefore finds in favor 
of Mr. Andreason. [R. at 72]. Gold's Gym cannot dispute that the issue of fraud was 
litigated in the previous action. 
The issue of fraud is one of the precise claims that Mr. Andreason sought by his 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata. [R. at 114-
33]. In his Complaint, Mr. Andreason specifically pleaded a cause of action for Fraud. 
[R. at 83-84]. This Fraud claim is identical to the fraud issue determined by this Court in 
the prior adjudication. [R. at 72]. Moreover, this claim is indisputably identified in the 
key factual findings and legal ruling made by the Court in the prior litigation. [Id.]. 
Thus, the current Fraud claim is identical to the fraud issue in the prior litigation. 
In denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the district 
court held that Mr. Andreason's fraud claim in this case was not identical to the court's 
fraud determination at Trial because: "The Court's finding of fraud by Gold's Gym was 
a response to Mr. Andreason's defense of fraud; the Court found that the contract was 
unenforceable." [R. at 160]. However, this ruling was an erroneous determination of 
law. In Utah, the elements of the "defense of fraud" are the same as the elements of the 
"claim of fraud." See, e.g., Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 
1274, 1278 (Utah 1997) ("To show their fraud defense is legally sufficient, appellants 
must state . . . the circumstances supporting each element of fraud.") (stating the nine 
elements necessary to prove a claim of fraud); Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798, 799-801 (Utah 1980) (holding that defense of fraud was established by 
proof of all nine elements required to establish claim of fraud); Conder v. Hunt. 2000 UT 
App Iff 13-15, 1 P.3d 558 (same). At trial, Mr. Andreason indisputably met the elements 
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of fraud sufficient to prove a defense of fraud. [R. at 72, 160]. Because the elements of 
the defense and claim of fraud are identical, the "identical issue" element is met in this 
instance. 
ii. MR. ANDREASON'S CLAIM FOR VIOLATION 
OF THE UCSPA 
In denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the district 
court held, without explanation, that "After reviewing the order itself and the verbal 
findings of Judge Laycock, it is also clear that the Court did not address the elements 
needed to establish liability under the theory of... the Consumer Sales Practices Act." 
[R. at 160]. 
However, Gold's Gym has admitted that after Mr. Andreason received his copy of 
the Agreement, Gold's Gym added additional information to the white and pink copies of 
the Agreement, the effect of which was to increase the length of the commitment 
purportedly agreed to by Mr. Andreason from a month-to-month to a full-year 
commitment. [R. at 404 U 9, 405 f 6, 390 If 4, 46411]. Gold's Gym has also admitted 
that it then attempted to force Mr. Andreason to pay for an additional seven months of 
membership at Gold's Gym, including using a collection agency to prosecute a civil 
action against Mr. Andreason to collect payment for the additional seven months. [R. at 
4041| 11, 3901f 6, 464 f 3,403 f 12, 3891 8, 464 % 1]. In addition, at Trial, the district 
court found that "Golds Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by 
Gold's Gym after Mr. Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud 
by Golds." [R. at 72, 402-03 1f 17, 389 f 11, 464 \ 1]. 
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These actions are squarely prohibited by the UCSPA. Under the UCSPA, a 
supplier of consumer transactions6 commits a deceptive act or practice if it knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in 
accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; [or] 
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not been 
previously agreed to by the consumer. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §13-1 l-4(2)(e), (r) (2000). 
Gold's Gym's actions were at least equal to, if not greater and more egregious 
than, simply "knowingly indicating] that the subject of a consumer transaction has been 
supplied in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§13-1 l-4(2)(e) (2000). In addition, Gold's Gym clearly attempted to "charge for a 
consumer transaction that has not been previously agreed to by the consumer." UTAH 
CODE ANN. §13-1 l-4(2)(r) (2000). The district court directly found that Gold's Gym 
altered the Contract after Andreason received his copy and then attempted to recover 
additional monies from him through AFS. [R. at 72]. Based on this finding and Gold's 
Gym's own admissions, the district court should have granted summary judgment on Mr. 
Andreason's UCSPA claim. 
6
 Gold's Gym does not dispute that it is a "supplier" under the Act. A "supplier" is 
defined as "a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who regularly 
solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly 
with the consumer." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-3(6). 
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c. The Issues of Fraud and UCSPA Violation Were 
Competently, Fully, And Fairly Litigated In The Prior 
Adjudication. 
Third, as discussed above, it is clear that the above issues were fully litigated at 
the Trial by Gold's Gym, through AFS. In dismissing Mr. Andreason's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, the district court stated that this element was not met 
because: "The Court's order and verbal findings did not address the elements of fraud, 
nor did they establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gold's Gym had acted 
fraudulently." [R. at 160]. However, the court at Trial was not compelled to recite every 
element of fraud to render its determination. In addition, it is likely that if Mr. 
Andreason, as the prevailing party, had been permitted to draft the Order—as opposed to 
Gold's Gym's privy, AFS—the court's findings at Trial would have been more clearly 
articulated. Moreover, the court's determination at Trial indicates that it was rendered 
based on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in the Order drafted by AFS's own 
counsel: "The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is different than Defendants 
copy and is clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72 (emphasis added)]. The lack of specificity 
by AFS in the Order it drafted should not compel the parties to completely relitigate the 
issue of fraud. 
Regardless, Utah courts have explained that the "full and fair litigation" element 
stems not from an exhaustive recitation of the elements of each claim, but from 
fundamental due process—that litigants have their day in court. See Copper State Thrift 
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted); see also 
Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246, 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). For purposes of due process, the 
parties must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to 
apprise them of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections. See id. 
At Trial, Gold's Gym had their day in court—they specifically demanded it. [R. at 
403 1f 14, 389 U 9, 464 ^ 1]. Moreover, they were clearly represented by counsel. [R. at 
72]. In fact, Gold's Gym was the only party that was represented by counsel at Trial. 
[Id.]. Gold's Gym entered documents into evidence. [Id.]. Finally, Gold's Gym cannot 
dispute that at Trial, both sides were permitted the opportunity to present facts and legal 
argument in their support, as well as introduce and cross-examine witnesses—both of 
which Gold's Gym did. Clearly, Gold's Gym was afforded the full protections of due 
process in this matter, and thus the "full and fair litigation" element of issue preclusion 
has been met. 
d. There Was A Final Adjudication In The Previous Action. 
Finally, it is undisputed that there was a final adjudication on the merits in the 
previous case. The district court's Order On Dismissal was based upon specific findings 
of fact and rulings of law, and constituted a dismissal on the merits. Specifically, the 
court held: "Based upon the findings, the court makes the ruling that Golds Gym 
engaged in fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff takes nothing 
and the case is hereby dismissed." [R. at 72]. This was clearly an adjudication on the 
merits. 
In addition, Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant 
part: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal 
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other 
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of 
an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b) (emphasis added). The trial court's Order did not specify that the 
dismissal did not operate as an adjudication on the merits. [R. at 72]. In addition, the 
Order did not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an 
indispensable party. [Id]. Therefore, by the plain language of Rule 41(b), the district 
court's Order On Dismissal operated as a final adjudication of the prior case on the 
merits. 
2. The District Court Erred in Refusing to Enter Partial Summary 
Judgment As To Gold's Gym' Liability For Fraud and a 
Violation Of The Consumer Sales Practices Act 
Because all four elements of issue preclusion are met, this Court should reverse 
the district court's order denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata and order that the district court enter partial summary 
judgment against Gold's Gym as to their liability for Fraud and a violation of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
Moreover, courts in Utah and throughout the United States have extolled the 
benefits of issue preclusion in reducing litigation costs and conserving judicial resources. 
The United States Supreme Court explained this doctrine in the matter of Montana v. 
United States 440 U.S. 147 (1979), wherein the Court stated: 
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and 
vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and 
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of 
inconsistent decisions. 
Id. at 153. These interests are particularly involved in this case. It would be unduly 
burdensome and patently unfair to compel Mr. Andreason to demonstrate yet again that 
Gold's Gym committed fraud against him by analyzing the parties' transactions and 
reviewing the different copies of the parties' Contract. Withholding summary judgment 
on this issue would also render the entire matter litigated before this Court a nullity, not 
to mention a waste of the district court's time and effort. 
Finally, relitigation of the fraud issue would create the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions on the litigated issue, which would be unfair to Mr. Andreason and all parties 
similarly situated. Such inconsistency undermines the public's confidence in the fair 
administration of justice in our courts. For all of these reasons, partial summary 
judgment as to Gold's Gym's liability for fraud and a violation of UCSPA should be 
entered. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated herein, Mr. Andreason respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the Order of the district court granting summary judgment to Gold's Gym 
and denying summary judgment to Mr. Andreason regarding his claim for statutory 
damages pursuant to the UCSPA. In addition, Mr. Andreason requests that this Court 
reverse the order of the district court denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata and hold that summary judgment 
is proper regarding Mr. Andreason's claims against Gold's Gym for Fraud and a violation 
of the UCSPA based upon res judicata. 
)th Dated this 8"1 day of June, 2005 
By-V 
Rod N. Andreason 
901 West Potomac Dr. 
Murray, UT 84123 
(801) 350-7801 (telephone) 
(801) 531-1486 (facsimile) 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of June, 2005 to the 
following: 
Brian C. Harrison 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C. 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Km N. Andreason ^ 
901 West Potomac Dr. 
Murray, UT 84123 
(801) 350-7801 (telephone) 
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KEVIN G. RICHARDS, P.C. (#533 9) 
RAYMOND B. ROUNDS (#5012) 
KEVIN G. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3839 S. West Temple Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 801-281-4222 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A F S . , I N C . 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
P l a i n t i f f , PURSUANT TO TRIAL 
) 
v s . ) 
CIVIL NO.010403063DC 
ROD ANDREASON 
Defendant(s). ) Judge Laycock 
This matter came on regularly before the court for Trial 
on November 2, 2001. Plaintiff appeared by and through attorney, 
Ron J. Noyes, who stood in for Kevin G. Richards; Defendant was 
also present. The Court made the following findings: 
1. The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is 
different than Defendants copy and is clearly fraud by Golds. 
2. Neither contract is compliant with the Truth in Lending 
requirements. 
Based upon the findings, the court makes the ruling that Golds 
Gym engaged in Fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant. 
Tab 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROD N. ANDREASON 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT FELSTEDT, an individual, DEAN 
VIERTEL, an individual, TROY 
PETERSON, an individual, BODY FIRM 
AEROBICS, INC., a Utah Corporation, and 
GOLD'S GYM OF PROVO a/k/a GOLD'S 




Case No. 020400494 
Date: October 2,2002 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter came on regularly before Judge Laycock on September 30, 2002, on plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After reviewing the file, memoranda, and argument of 
the parties the Court makes the following ruling. 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff, Mr. Andreason, has asked this Court to grant partial summary judgment against 
the listed defendants in this case on the issues of (1) fraud, (2) violation of the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, and (3) conspiracy to commit fraud. Plaintiff asserts that the AFS v. Andreason, 
Case No. 010403063 ("AFS case") precludes these issues from being re-litigated under the 
doctrine ofres judicata or specifically issue preclusion. 
On November 2, 2001, AFS v. Andreason was tried before Judge Laycock. Gold's Gym, 
through the collection agency it hired, sued the plaintiff for failure to make payments under a 
contract the parties entered into on October 11, 2000. Judge Laycock dismissed the action 
1 
against Mr. Andreason and stated that Gold's Gym had acted fraudulently in entering into a 
contract with Mr. Andreason. AFS's counsel prepared the order which was later signed by the 
Court. 
The plaintiff contends that this order and the verbal findings entered by the Court are 
sufficient to establish that Gold's Gym acted fraudulently when it induced the plaintiff to enter 
into the contract that was at issue in the AFS case. Plaintiff asserts that the issues should not be 
re-litigated because of issue preclusion. The Court disagrees with this contention. 
In order to establish issue preclusion, the following four elements must be present. First, 
the party in the present case must have been a party to or in privity with the party who was 
involved in the prior case. Second, the issue in the present action must be identical to that 
decided in the previous case. Third, the previous matter must have been fairly and fully litigated. 
Fourth, there must have been a final decision on the merits. 
Although the plaintiff has shown that Gold's Gym was in privity with AFS in the AFS 
case, the Court finds that the order and verbal findings entered by the Court are insufficient to 
establish the other three elements of issue preclusion. The Court's finding of fraud by Gold's 
Gym was a response to Mr. Andreason's defense of fraud; the Court found that the contract was 
unenforceable. The Court's order and verbal findings did not address the elements of fraud, nor 
did they establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gold's Gym had acted fraudulently. 
After reviewing the order itself and the verbal findings of Judge Lay cock, it is also clear 
that the Court did not address the elements needed to establish liability under the theory of 
conspiracy and the Consumer Sales Practices Act. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
2 
DATED this 2nd day of October 2002. 
/M„, 
«8# V ? % CLAUDIA LAYCOCK _ 
Sw y,< ' F O U R T H DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Case No. 020400494 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I sent a true and correct copy of this document to the following on 
the 7^_ day of October 2002: 
Mark W. Pugsley 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Brian C. Harrison 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
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Tab 3 
MARK W. PUGSLEY (AS253) 
JACQUELYND. ROGERS (A9062) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South Main Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone; (801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rod N. Andreason 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROD N. ANDREASON, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SCOTT FELSTED, an individual, DEAN 
VIERTEL, an individual, TROY 
PETERSON, an individual, BODY FIRM 
AEROBICS, INC., a Utah Corporation, and 
GOLD'S GYM OF PROVO a/k/a GOLD'S 
GYM, an unregistered d/b/a of Body Firm 
Aerobics, Inc. 
Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on July 3,2003, Plaintiff being 
represented by his attorneys, Mark Pugsley and Jacqueline Rogers, and the Defendants being 
represented by their attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Court having considered the Motions 
for Summary Judgment presented by both sides and having considered the evidence on file and 
the argument of counsel and being fully advised therein; 
AUG 0 b im 
ci- • 1 / H 
•••IV 
ORDER 
Civil No. 020400494 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
L Defendants are the owners of Gold's Gym. 
2. Plaintiff ajrid Defendants entered into a contract on October 11, 1999. 
3. Pat Baum., an employee of the Defendants, changed several terms of the contract, 
which converted the contract into a twelve-month agreement after the execution of said contract 
by the parties. 
4. Plaintiff terminated his contract with the Defendants after five (5) months. 
5. Defendants attempted to enforce said contract. 
6. In October 2000, Defendants employed a collection agency named AFS, Inc. to 
file a small claims action to have said contract delinquencies reduced to judgment. 
7. In prosecuting the small claims action against Plaintiff, AFS, Inc. filed a negative 
statement on Plaintiffs credit report. 
8. Said case was dismissed by the Court based upon the fraudulent action of Gold's 
Gym. 
9. Said act described above constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4(1) Utah Code 
Annotated. 
10. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has suffered loss or damages that were 
caused by Defendants' actions, as required under Section 13-11-19(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
11. Defendants placed the issue of damages before the Court by their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and supporting Affidavit, at which point Plaintiff had the burden of showing 
disputed facts related to damages. 
12. Plaintiff failed to carry his burden by failing to demonstrate that he had sustained 
any loss or damages that were caused by Defendants' actions. 
13. All fact discovery has been completed in this case. 
14. Based upon Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Walker case, the 
Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any loss or damages which puts said 
issues at issue. 
15. The Court finds that the credit card statements contained variable interest rates 
and that no showing was made connecting the change in the variable rate on said credit cards 
with any actions taken by the Defendants herein. 
16. The Court further finds that the credit card interest rates increased on occasion 
and decreased on occasion and that no evidence was put forth by Plaintiff to show the reason 
therefor. 
17. The Court concludes that said interest rate fluctuations could be caused by a late 
payment history of the Plaintiff economic factors unknown to the parties, and other reasons, 
18. The Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact as it relates to loss or damage 
sustained by the Plaintiff. 
19. With reiapect to the mortgage interest rate, Plaintiff has produced no evidence 
showing that he has incurred a higher rate of interest by virtue of any actions taken by the 
Defendants herein. 
20. The Court concludes that numerous factors are considered in arriving at a credit 
score and that no evidence has been received in this case regarding Plaintiffs credit score. 
21. Since all fact discovery is complete, any connection between the mortgage 
interest rate obtained by Plaintiff and any actions by the Defendants is completely a matter of 
speculation. 
22. The intereirt rate on the MBNA Platinum card and the evidence submitted in 
support thereof show thai Plaintiff had made two late payments, maintained a high balance, and 
that no connection has been established between the actions of the Defendants and the interest 
rate on said credit card. 
23. Plaintiff asserted that he incurred a $20.00 cancellation fee for canceling the 
automatic withdrawal authorization from his bank. No evidence was presented to support said 
claim and therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff did not sustain damage in this matter. 
24. The Court concludes that the time Plaintiff spent in defending himself against the 
action filed by AFS, Inc. is not damage that can be awarded under Utah Code Aim. § 13-11-
19(2) and further finds that no authority has been provided which allows for time spent preparing 
for a municipal case to be considered as damages under that statute. 
25. Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2) requires that the claimant establish some loss or 
damage in order for said Section to apply. This Plaintiff has failed to do. 
26. Plaintiff having failed to prove damages suffered as a result of Defendants' 
actions is not entitled to statutory damages, attorney's fees, court costs, or other claims against 
the Defendants. 
27. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
28. Plaintiff has previously withdrawn causes of action based upon conspiracy and 
consumer fraud. 
29. By this Ruling, the Court finds no cause of action on Plaintiffs first and third 
causes of action for the reasons heretofore stated. 
30. Because Plaintiff has failed to cany his burden of proof regarding the issue of loss 
and damages, the Court rules in favor of the Defendants herein. 
31. All other pending motions are hereby rendered moot by virtue of this Court's 
ruling in favor of the Defendants, 
32. This Court therefore dismisses all causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff herein 
and grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Said judgment is to be on the merits 
and with prejudice. 
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§ 13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales 
practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the policies 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with respect to the subject 
of this act among those states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply with the provisions of this 
act. 
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
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Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3 (2005) 
§ 13-11-3. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly or indirectly for money, credit, 
property, financial assistance, or any other thing of value on the plea or representation that it 
will be used for a charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation may be made in any manner, 
including: 
(a) any oral or written request, including a telephone request; 
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any handbill, written advertisement, or 
publication; or 
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or request of donations for any book, card, 
chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, ticket, flower, 
flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in 
connection with which any appeal is made for any charitable purpose, or where the name of 
any charitable organization or movement is used or referred to as an inducement or reason 
for making any purchase donation, or where, in connection with any sale or donation, any 
statement is made that the whole or any part of the proceeds of any sale or donation will go 
to or be donated to any charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete 
when made, whether or not the organization or person making the solicitation receives any 
contribution or makes any sale. 
(2) (a) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or 
other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both 
tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance) to, or apparently to, a person for: 
(i) primarily personal, family, or household purposes; or 
(ii) purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires: 
(A) expenditure of money or property by the person described in Subsection (2)(a); 
and 
(B) the person described in Subsection (2)(a) to perform personal services on a 
continuing basis and in which the person described in Subsection (2)(a) has not been 
previously engaged. 
(b) "Consumer transaction" includes: 
(i) any of the following with respect to a transfer or disposition described in Subsection 
(2)(a): 
(A) an offer; 
(B) a solicitation; 
(C) an agreement; or 
(D) performance of an agreement; or 
(ii) a charitable solicitation. 
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division of Consumer Protection. 
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that determines 
the rights of the parties and concerning which appellate remedies have been exhausted or 
the time for appeal has expired. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, governmental subdivision or 
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, cooperative, or any other legal 
entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who 
regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals 
directly with the consumer. 
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 3; 1983, ch. 58, § 4; 1987, ch. 105, § 2; 2000, ch. 57, § 1; 
2004, ch. 55, § 1. 
NOTES: 
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The 2004 amendment, effective March 15, 2004, deleted "including the use or misuse of 
personal identifying information of any person in relation to a consumer transaction" from the 
introductory part of Subsection (2)(a) and made numerous stylistic changes. 
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In view of (1) the legislatures mandate to construe the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
(UCSPA) liberally, (2) the stated purpose of keeping Utah law consistent with the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 5 41 et seq.) and the consumer protection laws of other 
states, and (3) the absence of any language or other expression of legislative intent to the 
contrary, the renting of residential housing is a consumer transaction within the meaning of 
the UCSPA. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991). 
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act applies to leases of residential property. 
Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997). 
SUPPLIER. 
This chapter is broad enough to impose liability upon suppliers of consumer goods who 
deceptively transact with other suppliers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 
201 (D. Utah 1988). 
Defendants, who were alleged to have tampered with vehicle odometers with the intent to 
defraud purchasers, were not insulated from liability for deceptive acts merely because they 
sold the vehicles involved to independent dealers for resale, rather than directly to 
consumers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1988). 
CITED in Heard v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. —Who is a "consumer" entitled to protection of state deceptive trade practice and 
consumer protection acts, 63 A.L.R.5th 1. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this 
article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (2005) 
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§ 13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction 
violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or 
practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval, 
performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality, 
grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or 
has been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact; 
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a 
reason that does not exist; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance 
with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity 
than the supplier intends; 
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not; 
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not; 
(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the supplier does 
not have; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a 
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, 
if the representation is false; 
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an 
inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the 
names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other 
consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the 
consumer enters into the transaction; 
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the 
services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific time is 
advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within 30 days, 
unless within the applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to 
either cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the 
supplier or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed by the supplier, but any 
refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer within ten business days after the seller 
receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement 
and receive the refund; 
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within 
three business days of the time of purchase if the sale is made other than at the supplier's 
established place of business pursuant to the supplier's personal contact, whether through 
mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct 
solicitation and if the sale price exceeds $ 25, unless the supplier's cancellation policy is 
communicated to the buyer and the policy offers greater rights to the buyer than this 
Subsection (2)(m), which notice shall be a conspicuous statement written in dark bold at 
least 12 point type, on the first page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as 
follows: "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT 
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation policy but 
not less than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR RECEIPT OF 
THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER."; 
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined under Title 76, 
Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act; 
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable solicitation 
will be donated or used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used by a particular 
organization, if the representation is false; 
(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle repair 
against his motor vehicle insurance policy: 
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written notice of: 
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and 
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the repair, which 
dollar amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or other copay arrangement in the 
consumer's insurance policy; or 
(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar amount a 
consumer was initially told he was responsible to pay as an insurance deductible or other 
copay arrangement for a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount 
is less than the full amount the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured to pay as 
a deductible or other copay arrangement, unless: 
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the repair, in 
which case, the full amount of the repair may be charged and collected from the consumer; 
or 
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of money 
the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other copay 
arrangement, in which case, the supplier may charge and collect from the consumer an 
amount that does not exceed the amount the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay 
as a deductible or other copay arrangement; 
(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer 
transaction, or any addendum to any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a 
consumer transaction, any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which 
a consumer is entitled under this chapter; 
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously been agreed to 
by the consumer; or 
(s) solicits or enters into a consumer transaction with a person who lacks the mental ability 
to comprehend the nature and consequences of: 
(i) the consumer transaction; or 
(ii) the person's ability to benefit from the consumer transaction. 
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 4; 1983, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 58, § 5; 1985, ch. 250, § 1; 
1987, ch. 105, § 3; 1995, ch. 237, § 1; 1998, ch. 194, § 1; 1999, ch. 21, § 8; 2001, ch. 
196, § 1; 2004, ch. 55, § 2. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection (2) 
(P)-
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "this" before "Subsection (2)(m)" 
near the middle of Subsection (2)(m). 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsections (2)(q) and (r); in 
Subsection (2)(m), substituted "personal contact, whether through mail, electronic mail, 
facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct solicitation" for "mail, 
telephone, or personal contact"; and made related changes. 
The 2004 amendment, effective March 15, 2004, added Subsection (2)(s) and made 
related changes. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Identity fraud, criminal provisions, § 76-6-1101 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
± 
Cause of action. 
i 
— Misrepresentation of warranty. 
± 
Transactions with other suppliers. 
i 
Cited. 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
-- MISREPRESENTATION OF WARRANTY. 
Claim that roof shingle manufacturer, through its literature or agent, made an express 
warranty to homeowner and later tried to disclaim or ignore that warranty and supplant it 
with a limited written warranty stated a cause for relief under Subsection (2)(j). State ex rel. 
Division of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). 
TRANSACTIONS WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS. 
This chapter is broad enough to impose liability upon suppliers of consumer goods who 
deceptively transact with other suppliers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 
201 (D. Utah 1988). 
Defendants, who were alleged to have tampered with vehicle odometers with the intent to 
defraud purchasers, were not insulated from liability for deceptive acts merely because they 
sold the vehicles involved to independent dealers for resale, rather than directly to 
consumers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1988;). 
CITED in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
TREATISES. --Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), § 5.08(c) 
(5). 
A.L.R. —Liability for delay in making repair of motor vehicle, 44 A.L.R.4th 1174. 
Real-estate broker's liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical 
defects in property sold, 46 A.L.R.4th 546. 
Liability of telephone company for mistakes in or omissions from its directory, 47 A.L.R.4th 
882. 
What goods or property are "used," "secondhand," or the like, for purposes of state 
consumer laws prohibiting claims that such items are new, 59 A.L.R.4th 1192. 
Products liability: roofs and roofing materials, 3 A.L.R.5th 851. 
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article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title. 
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§ 13-11-19. Actions by consumer 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at 
law, a consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is 
violating, or is likely to violate this chapter. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not 
in a class action, actual damages or $ 2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs. 
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy 
at law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and appropriate 
ancillary relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter. 
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a 
class action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this 
chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the 
consumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or 
13-11-5 by a final judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general jurisdiction and 
appellate courts of this state that was either officially reported or made available for public 
dissemination under Subsection 13- l l -7( l ) (c) by the enforcing authority ten days before the 
consumer transactions on which the action is based, or with respect to a supplier who agreed 
to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became final 
before the consumer transactions on which the action is based. 
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the 
damages can be computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of 
consumers who cannot be located with due diligence shall be transferred to the state 
treasurer pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act. 
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter 
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in 
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may award to the 
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this chapter has brought 
or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an act or 
practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the 
court to be settled under Subsection 13-l l-21(l)(a). 
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor 
of the enforcing authority under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of 
the facts on which it is based in later proceedings under this section against the same person 
or a person in privity with him. 
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy 
to the enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file maintained under Subsection 13-11-7 
(D(e). 
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two years after occurrence of a 
violation of this chapter, or within one year after the termination of proceedings by the 
enforcing authority with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later. When a 
supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter 
arising out of the transaction on which suit is brought. 
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 19; 1983, ch. 58, § 9; 1993, ch. 4, § 56; 1995, ch. 198, § 3. 
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LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. S&M CENTRAL SERVICE CORPORATION, 
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No. 03 C 4986 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN 
DIVISION 
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November 5, 2004, Decided 
November 8, 2004, Docketed 
DISPOSITION: Judgment entered for plaintiff. Plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction 
granted; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and Motion to 
Strike S&M's Brief on Damages denied. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff the owner of five trademarks related to its cigarette 
products, brought post trial motions, seeking: an award of statutory damages of $ 
500,000, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(c); an award of its costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(b); a permanent injunction barring 
defendant infringer from selling, offering for sale or distributing counterfeit cigarettes, 
and, amendment of to add individual defendants. 
OVERVIEW: The complaint alleged that the infringers violated the Trademark Act of 
1946, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051 et seq., by willfully offering for sale, selling, and distributing 
counterfeit versions of the owner's Newport cigarettes. A jury found that consumers 
would likely confuse the counterfeits with genuine Newports, and the infringing 
corporation had acted willfully or with willful blindness. The owner also challenged 
financial data in the form of tax returns submitted by the infringing corporation as 
improper. The tax forms were not a pleading, and actually showed real profits for the tax 
years, and so were not prejudicial to the owner, so the motion to strike was denied. The 
court noted that the five trademarks infringed were of considerable value. Since part of 
the purpose of statutory damages was to deter the current violator and other potential 
future violators, actual damages were less relevant and statutory damages were 
appropriate. The court found that a $ 250,000 award was fully supported by its 
concurrence with the jury's determination. The owner also sought to add, after the fact, 
two individual officers of the infringer as defendants to conform to the evidence. 
OUTCOME: The court awarded statutory damages of $ 50,000 per infringed mark, 
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and a permanent injunction. The motion to amend 
the pleadings to conform to the evidence adding two individuals as defendants was 
denied. 
CORE TERMS: counterfeit, cigarette, infringement, trademark, infringed, willful, statutory 
damage, dollar, brand, reproduction, imitation, carton, actual damages, packaging, genuine, 
conform, selling, amend, likely to cause, evidence presented, motion to strike, willfulness, 
offering, deter, consumer products, damage award, deceive, counterfeiter, distributing, 
infringer 
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JUDGES: JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge. 
OPINIONBY: JAMES F. HOLDERMAN 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco Co., ("Lorillard"), filed suit against defendant S&M Central Service 
Corporation, ("S&M"), alleging that S&M infringed of five of Lorillard's registered trademarks 
in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., ("Lanham Act"), by 
willfully, or with willful blindness, offering for sale, selling and distributing counterfeit 
versions of Lorillard's Newport cigarettes. At the conclusion of a two day trial on the merits, a 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Lorillard and stated: (1) yes, consumers would likely 
confuse the cigarette packs bearing the counterfeit marks sold by S&M with genuine Newport 
cigarette packs; and (2) yes, S&M's actions were [*2] taken willfully or committed with 
willful blindness. (Dkt. No. 49.) 
Lorillard's August 4, 2004 post-trial motions request this court to (1) award Lorillard 
statutory damages of five hundred thousand dollars, ($ 500,000) n l , pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(c); (2) award Lorillard costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(b); (3) enter a permanent injunction barring S&M from selling, offering for sale or 
distributing counterfeit cigarettes, and, (4) amend the pleadings to add Safwan Alkhawan 
("Alkhawan") and Marwan Khawam ("Khawam") as individually liable defendants in order to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence presented at trial. Lorillard also submitted a motion on 
August 16, 2004 to Strike the Defendant's Brief on Damages pursuant to Rules 12, 26 and 3Z 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ("Rules"). 
- Footnotes -
n l Lorillard arrived at the $ 500,000 figure by requesting damages of one hundred thousand 
dollars, ($ 100,000), for each of the five infringed trademarks. 
End Footnotes [*3] 
S&M, in its Brief Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004, requests that if any damages are 
awarded, the court should award 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)'s minimum amount of $ 500 per 
infringed mark for a total award of $ 2,500. S&M also argues that an award of attorneys' fees 
and costs is not appropriate in this case. 
For the reasons set forth below, this court awards to Lorillard, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117 
(c), statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a total 
statutory damage award of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000). This court also 
finds that Lorillard is entitled to receive reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. 5 1117(b) but the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.3 
before this court can calculate a figure for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. In addition, 
this court grants Lorillard's request for a permanent injunction, but denies Lorillard's Motion 
to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and denies Lorillard's August 16, 2004 
Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Lorillard Tobacco Company [*4] 
Lorillard is the fourth largest tobacco company in the United States. (Stipulation and 
Statement of Uncontested Facts P 4, Ex. 1 to the Pre-Trial Order, [hereinafter Uncontested 
Facts].) First introduced into the market in 1956, Newport is a Lorillard cigarette brand. (Id. 
at P 6.) Newport is the leading brand of menthol cigarettes sold in the United States, and it is 
the second leading cigarette brand overall with an eight percent market share. (Id. at P 6-7.) 
Lorillard has protected the value of the Newport brand by registering the five following 
trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Reg. No. 1,108,876; Reg. 
No. 1,178,413; Reg. No. 1,191,816; Reg. No. 1,920,066; and Reg. No. 2,600,870. (Id. at P 
10.) Four of the marks, Nos. 1,108,876; 1,178,417; 1,191,816; and 1,920,666, have 
attained incontestable status under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). (Id.) 
B. S&M Central Service Corporation and its interaction with Lorillard 
S&M operates a gas station in Chicago, Illinois. (Trial Tr. pg. 59.) The station sells gasoline, 
operates maintenance bays, and sells consumer products including food, magazines and 
cigarettes. (Uncontested [*5] Facts at P 3.) Lorillard became aware of counterfeit Newport 
cigarettes at S&M when one of Lorillard's sales representatives made a sales call to S&M. (Id. 
at 16.) The sales representative purchased two cartons of the counterfeit cigarettes. (Trial Tr. 
at 42.) On July 18, 2003, Lorillard obtained an Ex Parte Seizure Order from this court 
authorizing a seizure of counterfeit cigarettes at S&M. The executed search of S&M resulted 
in a seizure of 83 cartons and 9 packages of counterfeit Newport cigarettes and associated 
business records. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Lorillard's Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages 
On August 16, 2004, Lorillard filed a motion to strike S&M's August 6, 2004 brief on damages 
under Rules 12, 26, and 37. Lorillard's motion asserts two separate concerns. First, Lorillard 
argues that S&M's brief contains misstatement of facts unsupported by citation to the record. 
Second, Lorillard argues that S&M improperly included its 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns 
as an exhibit to S&M's brief on damages. Lorillard argues that it had requested financial 
information included tax returns from S&M during discovery, that S&M had failed to disclose 
these items, and therefore [*6] S&M should be prohibited from using these documents 
under Rule 37. Lorillard requests the court to strike S&M's brief in whole, or in the alternative 
strike specific offending portions of the brief, and the impose sanctions against S&M. 
S&M counters that the documents provided with its brief were specifically requested by the 
court at the end of the trial, that these documents were not disclosed during discovery 
because they were not relevant and the information contained in the brief is appropriate 
since S&M is making arguments to the court. S&M further argues that Lorillard should be 
sanctioned for bringing its motion to strike. 
Lorillard is unable to bring a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Rule 12(f) provides that"*1"?1 
"the court may strike from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The plain language of 
Rule 12(f) states that the Rule applies to "pleadings." HN2lrA memorandum submitted in 
support of a court's determination of damages is not a pleading under the Rules. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 7(a) (Defining pleadings as either a complaint, answer, reply to a counterclaim, an 
answer to a cross-claim, [*7] a third-party complaint, or third-party answer); see, e.g., 
E.E.O.C. v. Admiral Maint. Serv., LP., 174 F.R.D. 643, 645-47 (N.D. III. 1997). 
Consequently, by the plain language of Rules, Rule 12(f) is not applicable. The court notes, 
however, that any evaluation of the facts must be based on the record presented to the court 
and the court will provide proper citations to the record were appropriate. 
Furthermore, this court concludes that it will consider the tax returns provided by S&M in its 
brief on damages. H/V3"?The language of Rule 37(c) allows a court to consider evidence that 
otherwise would be excluded when the result is harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). In this case, 
the court concludes that S&M*s decision to provide its 2001, 2003 and 2003 tax returns was 
harmless to Lorillard and actually undercuts certain of S&M's arguments due to the way that 
S&M uses the tax returns in its brief on damages. 
S&M provides its tax returns as support for its statement that "S&M has not been a profitable 
enterprise. The attached tax returns of 2001, 2002, and 2003 show that there was no 
taxable income to the company. As a result, any award of damages would cause a hardship 
to the [*8] Defendant." (Def. Br. Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004 at 3.) However, the 
information contained in the tax returns contradict the statement that any award of damages 
would be a hardship. It is true that S&M reported zero taxable income on its 2001, 2002 and 
2003 federal tax returns. However, the zero taxable figure was the result of a Net Operating 
Loss deduction, ("NOL"), that S&M was able to take during those three years.HN4^ A NOL is a 
non cash deduction that allows a company to "carry-forward" and/or "carry-back" prior year 
losses and recognize them as current year deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 172. Consequently, 
S&M's statement that it "has not been a profitable enterprise" may be technically correct for 
tax purposes since S&M reported no taxable income. However, the tax returns actually 
undermine S&M's statement that "any award of damages would cause a hardship for the 
Defendant" because S&M recognized a profit before the NOL deduction. S&M's creditability as 
to its statement of financial condition is further undermined by the millions of dollars of wire 
transfers uncovered by Lorillard. (Pis. Brief on Damages and Att'ys Fees of August 6, 2004 at 
Ex. [*9] I.) Since the tax returns submitted by S&M are actually harmful to S&M and 
helpful to Lorillard, the court concludes there is no harm as to Lorillard and will deny 
Lorillard's motion to strike. In light of this decision, S&M's motion to sanction Lorillard for 
bringing its motion to strike is denied. 
B. Lorillard's Motion for Statutory Damages under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c) 
w/V5TTitle 15, Section 1117 allows a plaintiff to elect, at any time before final judgment is 
rendered, one of two alternative recovery options for trademark infringement: (1) the actual 
damages caused by the infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); or (2) statutory damages. 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(c). Congress provided the statutory damages option of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) 
through the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 7, 
110 Stat. 1386. This option was added due to the concern that a counterfeiter might hide, 
alter or destroy records, thus making it impossible for a plaintiff to determine the scope of, or 
be able to prove, actual damages. Louis Vuitton v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) [*10] (citing S. Rep. No. 177, 104 Cong. (1995)). 
Section 1117(c)(1) allows H/V67statutory damages of "not less than $ 500 and no more than 
$ 100,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed, as the court considers just." 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c)(1). In addition, " "^Sect ion 
1117(c)(2) allows a statutory award of up to $ 1,000,000 per counterfeit mark "if the court 
finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful." 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c)(2)-
Although section 1117(c) contains the dollar ranges for possible statutory damage awards, 
the statute does not provides guidance on how to select a damage figure within statutory 
dollar range. Courts interpreting section 1117(c) have looked by analogy to case law applying 
the statutory damage provision of the Copyright Act contained in 17 U.S.C. 5 504(c). Sara 
Lee v. Bags of New York, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Cases decided 
under the Copyright Act, which deals with a similar problem and a similar legislative grant to 
discretion, afford guidance here."). Accord, Tommy Hilfiqer Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's [ *11] 
Family Clothing, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8788, No. 1:00-CV-1934-BBM, 2003 WL 
22331254, at *28(N.D. Ga. May 9, 2003); Louis Vuitton, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Microsoft 
Corp. v. Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL 
58950 at * 11 (N.D. III. Jan. 22, 2001); , Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc., 
129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
The Seventh Circuit's standard for awarding copyright statutory damages under 17 U.S.C § 
504(c), and thus the standard this court will use for awarding trademark statutory damages 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), is enumerated in Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club. 930 F.2d 1224, 
1229 (7th Cir. 1991). Under the Chi-Boy standard, Hyv*7a court awarding statutory damages 
is "not required to follow any rigid formula but instead enjoys wide discretion." Id. In 
computing the award amount, a court may consider factors such as "the difficulty or 
impossibility of proving actual damages, the circumstances of the infringement, and the 
efficacy of the damages as a deterrent." Id. Additionally, statutory damages are appropriate 
to "penalize [ *12] the infringer and deter future violations" when the infringement was 
willful. Id. at 1230. 
Lorillard argues for a damages award of at least $ 100,000 per each of the five infringed 
marks for a minimum damage award of $ 500,000. Lorillard argues that the $ 500,000 is 
appropriate in light of (1) S&M's annual total gross sales of approximately $ 1.35 million, (2) 
S&M's annual total gross sales of cigarettes of $ 300,000, (3) the "immeasurable value" of 
Lorillard's trademarks and the risk that customers using inferior counterfeit cigarettes will 
stop buying Newport products, and, (4) will serve to deter both S&M and other potential 
infringers. (Pis. Brief on Damages and Att'ys Fees of August 6, 2004 at pg 12-13, 18.) In 
addition, Lorillard argues that the court should reject any of the S&M's arguments about 
inability to pay a damages award. According to Lorillard, S&M's financial information should 
be "viewed with a healthy degree of skepticism," since they have failed to provide supporting 
documentation and Lorillard uncovered "millions of dollars worth of foreign wire transfers" 
made by S&M. (Id. at 13.) 
Lorillard also argues for the court to find that S&M was [*13] willful in its infringement. A 
finding of willful infringement would allow for a damages award of up to $ 1,000,000 per 
counterfeit mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2), for a total potential award of $ 5,000,000. 
According to Lorillard, evidence of S&M's willfulness include (1) the purchase of larger than 
usual quantities of purported Newport cigarettes from Cam-Kat at a price well below market 
value and in unusual packaging that differed significantly from the genuine Newport 
packaging, and, (2) the jury's verdict finding willful infringement. (Id. at 15.) Additionally, 
Lorillard argues that S&M's attempts to rebut the question of willfulness merely highlight 
their own guilt," (Id.), and they have exacerbated their willful purchases of counterfeit 
Newports by "lying throughout this case - from the day of the ex parte seizure to the last day 
of trial." (Id. at 16.) 
S&M argues the court should impose no damages or at the most the minimum statutory 
penalty of $ 500 per infringed mark for a total award of $ 2,500. S&M argues that (1) the 
conduct of defendants in other reported infringement cases is more willful and done with 
more disdain than in this [ *14] case, and therefore warranted higher damages, (Defs. Brief 
Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004 at pg 2); (2) S&M has not been a profitable enterprise 
and therefore any damage award would cause a hardship, (Id.); (3) the actual damage to 
Lorillard was very small due to the small number of cartons of counterfeit product purchased, 
(Id. at 4.); (4) despite the jury's finding of willfulness, the evidence for willfulness was not 
overwhelming, (Id.); (5) Lorillard shares some level of responsibility since it possessed 
specialized and sophisticated knowledge about how to identify counterfeit packages and 
never shared this information with S&M, (Id. at 5); and, (6) the court should not be bound 
by the jury's findings. (Id. at 6) 
This court concludes that the appropriate damage award in this case is $ 50,000 per infringed 
mark for a total statutory damages award of $ 250,000. This amount is appropriate due to 
the value of the trademarks, the conduct by S&M, and the need to deter future conduct by 
S&M and other potential counterfeiters. Furthermore, this court notes that an award of $ 
250,000 is reasonable and fair in light of the range of awards provided by other 
courts [*15] awarding damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) n2, and that the total potential 
award could have been as high as $ 5,000,000 due to the maximum statutory award of $ 
1,000,000 for each willfully infringed trademark. 
Footnotes 
n2 A figure of $ 50,000 per infringed mark for a total award of $ 250,000 is within the range 
of statutory awards made by other courts under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). See Philip Morris USA, 
Inc. v. Felizardo, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11154, No. 03 Civ. 5891, 2004 WL 1375277, at *7 
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004) ($ 62,500 statutory damage award for two infringed 
trademarks when defendant attempted to sell 7500 counterfeit cartons of cigarettes); Philip 
Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (CD. Cal. 2003) ($ 
2,000,000 statutory damage award for two infringed trademarks when defendant imported 
8,000,000 counterfeit cigarettes); see e.g., Silhouette Int'l Schmied v. Chakhbazian, No. 04 
Civ. 3613, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 4, 2004) ($ 250,000 statutory damage award for infringement 
of multiple eyewear trademarks); Microsoft Corp v. V3 Solutions, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15008, No. 01 C 4693, 2003 WL 22038593, at *16 (N.D. III. Aug. 28, 2003) ($ 35,000 
statutory damage award for seven infringed Microsoft software trademarks); Microsoft Corp. 
v. Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL 
58950, at *11 (N.D. III. Jan. 22, 2001) ($ 1,400,000 statutory damage for the infringement 
of seven Microsoft software trademarks). 
End Footnotes [*16] 
The five trademarks infringed by S&M are of considerable worth and value. Lorillard has 
taken considerable action to cultivate, maintain and strengthen these trademarks including: 
(1) registering the trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
(Uncontested Facts at P 8); (2) manufacturing the Newport product through strict quality 
control standards, (Id. at P 5); (3) investing substantial time, energy and money in 
advertising and promoting the Newport product (Id. at P 6); (4) training its sales personnel 
to be aware of counterfeit products so, like in this case, they can identify and report 
suspicious items, (Trial Tr. at pg 33.); and, (5) protecting the value of its trademarks by 
litigating against trademark infringers. 
Congress has provided the option of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c) and 
Lorillard has elected to pursue that remedy. Consequently, the significant value of Lorillard's 
brand and the efforts taken to protect, promote and enhance that brand should be 
considered by the court in the determination of the appropriate dollar figure for the award. 
Furthermore, the actual damages incurred by Lorillard are of [ *17] lesser concern in 
determining a proper damage award because Congress' decision to allow statutory damages 
under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c) was in direct recognition of the fact that the calculation of the 
actual damages may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Louis Vuitton v. Veit, 211 F. 
Supp. 2d 567f 583 fE.D. Pa. 2002) (citing S. Rep. No. 177, 104 Cong. (1995)). 
The actual damages figure is also less relevant since part of the purpose of statutory 
damages is to deter the current violator and other potential future violators. Thus, the court 
believes that a damage award limited to Lorillard's lost profits would have little to no 
deterrent effect on future violations. HN9+A counterfeiter must fear more than just having to 
turn over his ill gotten gains to the rightful owners. Instead, the counterfeit must understand 
that he risks his financial future by engaging in his illegal practice. As the Seventh Circuit has 
held, "one who undertakes a course of infringing conduct may neither sneer in the face of the 
[trademark] owner nor hide its head in the sand like an ostrich." Wildlife Express Corp. v. 
Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502r 514 (7th Cir. 1994) [*18] (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, deterring S&M along with potential future trademark infringers is an important 
consideration in light of the fact that counterfeiters often times produces lower quality 
products than the original. Lorillard properly notes that infringement deprives the rightful 
owner of profits and reduces the value of its brands. But an additional concern, above and 
beyond the financial harm, is that counterfeit consumer products can also potentially pose 
the risk of being more harmful or dangerous then the real product. The House of 
Representatives in its report on the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-153, § 7, 110 Stat. 1386, noted, "even more grievous than the enormous 
economic losses suffered by American companies are the serious health and safety hazards 
caused by criminal counterfeiting." H. Rep. No. 556, 104 Cong. (1996). 
The court is not entering into a discussion of the general health effects of cigarettes or 
whether the counterfeit cigarettes sold by S&M were more harmful than the authentic 
Newport product. Instead, the court is noting that there was no proof presented by the 
parties that the counterfeit Newport products [*19] are subject to any type of safety review 
or quality control process when manufactured by someone other than Lorillard. Cigarettes 
are consumer products and the retail establishments that sell cigarettes often sell other 
consumer products such as food, beverages, over-the-counter medicines and cosmetics. S&M 
sells food and beverages as well as cigarettes. (Uncontested Facts at P 3.) The statutory 
damage award will deter S&M and other retail establishments from purchasing counterfeit 
consumer products, and this in turn will help to reduce the probability that consumers will 
purchase counterfeit products that may be more dangerous than the authentic items. 
The court's belief that a $ 250,000 award is fully supported by its concurrence with the jury's 
determination of S&M's willful infringement. A finding of willful infringement allows the court 
to award the maximum statutory damage amount, if appropriate under the circumstances of 
the case, of $ 1,000,000 per infringed mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), for a total potential award 
in this case of $ 5,000,000. 
/yyvi07,|lWillful infringement may be attributed to the defendant's actions where he had 
knowledge that his conduct constituted [ *20] infringement or where he showed a reckless 
disregard for the owner's rights. Thus, knowledge need not be proved directly, but can be 
inferred from a defendant's conduct." Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL 58950, at *11 (citing Wildlife Express Corp., 18 F.3d at 511). 
Willful infringement may be shown by the fact that the "defendant ignored the plaintiff's 
notices ..., did not seek advice of an attorney, and passed the matter off as a nuisance." 
Wildlife Express Corp., 18 F.3d at 511. 
Several facts support the jury's determination of willfulness. S&M purchased the counterfeit 
cigarettes at a price below the market price. Khawam testified that S&M obtained the 
counterfeit cigarettes at a price of $ 34 per carton instead of the normal rate of $ 40 per 
carton. (Trial Tr. 155, 161.) Khawam admitted during his testimony that price was low 
enough to make him inspect the tax stamps and the name brands on a sample of the cartons 
he purchased for Cam-Kat. (Trial Tr. 160.) 
Additionally evidence is that packaging for the counterfeit cigarettes, including the outer 
boxes, was different from the packaging used for authentic [*21] Newport cigarettes. (Trial 
Ex. 30 - 32c.) Alkawham, when questioned about the differences in the packaging during his 
testimony, responded, "it's not my business to find out if they're counterfeit or not." (Trial Tr. 
91.) 
In light of the reasons set forth above, this court awards to Lorillard, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 
1117(c), statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a 
total statutory damage award of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000). This 
amount is within the range authorized by Congress under the statute and is appropriate in 
light of the evidence presented at trial. 
C. Award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(b) and Rule 
54(d)(1) 
Lorillard seeks an award of $ 140,000 for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. HNllm+As the 
prevailing party, Lorillard is entitled to its costs other than attorneys' fees as a matter of 
course pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). " ^ ^ " T h e court in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
Exceptional cases allowing for an award of [*22] attorneys' fees include "acts of 
infringement [that] are 'malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful."' BASF Corp. v. Old World 
Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1099 f7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 
Inc.. 886 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1989)), 
An award of reasonable attorneys's fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) is appropriate in light of 
the jury's determination, and the court's concurrence in that determination, of willful 
infringement by S&M. The parties must comply with the Local Rule 54.3, before the court can 
determine the amount of fees and costs which reasonably should be awarded. 
D. Permanent Injunction Barring S&M from Selling, Offering for Sale or Distributing 
Counterfeit Cigarettes 
Lorillard seeks a permanent injunction to bar S&M from selling, offering for sale or 
distributing counterfeit cigarettes. HN13TTh\s court has power to enter such an injunction, 
"according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem 
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the 
Patent and Trademark Office." 15 U.S.C. § 1116 [ *23] (a). This court grants the injunction, 
as detailed below, in the "Conclusion" section of this opinion. 
E. Lorillard's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented at Trial 
Lorillard moves to amend the pleadings to add Safwan Alkhawan, ("Alkhawam"), and Marwan 
Khawam ("Khawam") as individually liable defendants in order to conform the pleadings to 
the evidence presented at trial pursuant to Rule 15(b). Alkhawan is the owner of S&M. (Trial 
at pg. 58.) Alkhawan handles S&M's financial activities including its bank accounts, the 
paying of bills and the writing of checks. (Trial Tr.pg 60.) Alkhawan has employed his brother 
Khawam to run the gas station on a daily basis for the past ten years. (Id.) 
/y/vi4-yAs a g e n e r a | r u | e / corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for infringing 
actions taken by the corporation. Drink Group, Inc. v. Gulfstream Communications, 7 F. 
Supp. 2d 1009, 1010 (N.D. III. 1998) (citing Dangler v. Imperial Mach. Co., 11 F.2d 945, 947 
(7th Cir. 1926)). However, this court has recognized that an individual may be held liable for 
a corporation's infringement under the theory of vicarious liability or [ *24] contributory 
liability. Microsoft Corp. v. V3 Solutions, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15008, No. 01 C 4693, 
2003 WL 22038593, at *13 (N.D. III. Aug. 28, 2003) (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971)). "Personal liability for trademark 
infringement... is established if a corporate officer is a moving, active, conscious force 
behind the defendant corporation's infringement." Dynamic Force v. Dynamic Force, Ltd., 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892, No. 98 C 5922, 1999 WL 342407, at *4 (N.D. III. May 14, 
1999). 
The factual situation in the present case is different from the situation in the V3 Solutions 
and Dynamic Force cases. In those cases, the individual corporate officer had been named as 
a defendant in the original complaint filed with the court. Thus, the question was whether it 
was appropriate to find personal liability or only limit liability to the named corporation. 
However, in the present case, Alkhawan and Khawam have never been named as defendants 
in the case. Service of process was only effectuated on S&M, not on Alkhawan or Khawam. 
(Dkt. No. 14.) The U.S. Marshall's served Khawam in person on July 18, 2003, however, 
Khawam was served [ *25] in his role as an employee of S&M and not in his capacity as an 
individual. (Dkt. No. 13.) 
H/V I5Trhis court does have the ability under Rule 15 to add new defendants after trial and 
judgment has been entered. However, as the Supreme Court held in Nelson v. Adams, that if 
the court adds a new party to the litigation, due process requires that the new party is given 
an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability. 529 U.S. 460, 463, 146 L. Ed. 2d 
530, 120 S. Ct- 1579 (2000). Thus, this court, although it has the power to add Alkhawan 
and Khawam, cannot immediately award judgment against them in favor of Lorillard. 
Instead, if this court decides to add Alkhawan and Khawam, it must give them the 
opportunity to respond. 
Furthermore, H/VI6"?although Rule 15 provides a liberal policy for amending pleadings, the 
right to amend is not absolute. See Crestview Vill. Apartments v. United States Dep't of 
Hous. and Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 2004 WL 1965663, at *5 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Perkins 
v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1991)). Lorillard provides no reason for its 
failure to name Alkhawan and Khawam as individual defendants [*26] before the trial. 
Lorillard was aware of Alkhawan and Khawam existence and their roles in the counterfeiting 
before the trial. Alkhawan was present for this trial, however, his presence was in his 
capacity as the owner of S&M. Whether he and Khawam would have dealt with this case in 
the same way as S&M, if they were facing personal liability and a possible judgment against 
them as individuals, is a matter of speculation. The only way to know would be to retry the 
case and the court is unwilling at this point to impose to undertake that burden especially 
when Lorillard could have named Alkhawan and Khawam as defendants much earlier in the 
litigation. Consequently, the court denies Lorillard's motion to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence presented at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court order judgment to Plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco 
Company of statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a 
total statutory damage award, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c), of Two Hundred and Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000) from Defendant S&M Central Service Corporation. This court 
also finds that Lorillard [ *27] Tobacco Company is entitled to receive reasonable costs and 
attorneys' fees from S&M Central Service Corporation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(b), but 
the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.3 as follows: Lorillard must 
provide S&M with its 54.3 material by November 12, 2004 and S&M must provide Lorillard 
with its 54.3 material by November 23, 2004. The parties should then attempt to resolve any 
remaining disputes over attorneys' fees and costs. If an agreement cannot be reached, 
Lorillard's further petition for fees and costs, including the joint statement under 54.3(e), is 
due no later than December 6, 2004. Response is due December 17, 2004 and the reply is 
December 28, 2004. 
This court denies Lorillard's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and 
denies Lorillard's August 16, 2004 Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages. 
The court orders the clerk of this court to release the five hundred dollar ($ 500) bond posted 
by Lorillard Tobacco Company at the commencement of this action on July 18, 2003, plus 
interest, be immediately released to Martin Kedziora or Thomas Kost in a check payable to 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP. [ *28] 
Furthermore, it is therefore ordered that defendant S&M Central Service Corporation, and 
their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those personal or entities in active concert 
or participating with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or 
otherwise, are permanently enjoined from doing, or assisting others in doing, the following 
acts: 
(i) using any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of the 
Lorillard Marks in connection with the importation, sale, offering for sale, or 
distribution of cigarettes in the United States, which cigarettes in fact are not 
connected with Lorillard or are not genuine Lorillard products, which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; 
(ii) using the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of the same in any manner likely to cause others to believe that 
Defendants' products are connected with Lorillard or are genuine Lorillard 
products if they are not, which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive; 
(iii) passing off, inducing, or enabling others to sell or pass off any merchandise 
which is [ *29] not genuine Lorillard merchandise as and for genuine Lorillard 
merchandise; 
(iv) committing any other acts reasonably calculated to cause purchasers to 
believe that Defendant's products are Lorillard's products, when in fact such 
products are not Lorillard products; 
(v) importing, shipping, delivering, distributing, holding for sale, returning, 
transferring, or otherwise moving or disposing of in any manner such cigarettes 
falsely bearing one or more of the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of the same; 
(vi) discussing or communicating any aspect of the seizure of counterfeit 
cigarettes or the identifying markers of counterfeit cigarettes with any person or 
entity selling or attempting to sell cigarettes to Defendants; 
(vii) assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in engaging 
in or performing any of the activities referred to in the above paragraphs (i) 
through (vi); and (viii) other than by an order of this Court, 
(1) selling, moving, destroying, or otherwise disposing of any goods, 
boxes, labels, packaging or other items or documents bearing any 
reproduction, counterfeit, or imitation of the Lorillard [ *30] Marks, 
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive; 
(2) moving, destroying, or otherwise disposing of any business 
records or documents relating in any way to the manufacture, 
importation, acquisition, purchase, distribution, or sale of goods or 
merchandise bearing any of the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction, 
counterfeit, or imitation of the Lorillard Marks, which such use is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(3) assisting any third party in identifying, moving, destroying, or 
otherwise disposing of any reproduction, counterfeit or imitation 
goods, as well as any records pertaining to reproduction, counterfeit 
or imitation goods, which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive. 
S&M Central Service Corporation and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those 
personal or entities in active concert or participating with them who receive actual notice of 
this order by personal service or otherwise is warned that any act by them in violation of any 
of the terms of this Order may be considered and prosecuted as contempt of this Court. 
ENTER: 
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN 
United [*31] States District Judge 
DATE: November 5, 2004 
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
Decision by Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been tried and 
a decision has been rendered. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant in the amount of $ 250,000.00 plus costs and attorneys' fees. 
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RUSS MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. MUSIC HALL CENTER for the PERFORMING ARTS, INC., 
Defendant. 
No. 95-CV-70910 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN 
DIVISION 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17904 
November 2, 1995, Dated 
November 2, 1995, FILED 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Before the court was plaintiff photographer's motion for 
summary judgment and defendant music hall center's cross-motion for summary 
judgment on the photographer's lawsuit that alleged a copyright infringement in the 
music hall center's use of a photograph taken by the photographer. 
OVERVIEW: The photographer had taken a picture of Dizzy Gillespie that he had 
donated to the museum. With the museum's permission, the music hall center used the 
photograph as a program cover for the Montreaux Detroit Jazz Festival. The 
photographer filed a lawsuit against the music hall center alleging a copyright 
infringement in the use of the Dizzy Gillespie photograph. Both the photographer and the 
music hall center filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary 
judgment to the photographer. The photographer was not required to mark the donated 
print with the copyright symbol to protect his ownership because his gift to the museum 
was not a transfer of copyright ownership. Although the Copyright Act barred an action 
for infringement without registration, the photographer effectively cured the deficiency 
by registering the copyright before or within five years of its publication, as provided by 
17 U.S.C.S. 5 410(c). The photographer was entitled to actual damages that could be 
attributed to the music hall center's infringing activity. 
OUTCOME: The court granted the photographer's motion for summary judgment on his 
lawsuit that alleged a copyright infringement in the music hall center's use of a 
photograph taken by the photographer. 
CORE TERMS: photograph, summary judgment, registration, infringer, infringement, 
copyright infringement, actual damages, museum, display, notice, gift, moving party, 
registered, ownership, register, publicly, infringement of copyright, cross-motion, distributed, 
copyrighted, modified, donated, print, nonmoving party, matter of law, infringing, innocent, 
cured, effective date, reasons stated 
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"A^iThe test for the grant of a motion for summary judgment is that the substantive 
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affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the 
entry of summary judgment. Thus, factual disputes that are irrelevant or 
unnecessary will not be considered. To meet this standard, the moving party need 
not support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials "negating" the 
opponents claim. The burden on the moving party may be discharged by 
demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving 
party's case. Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden passes to the 
non-moving party to establish, after an adequate opportunity for discovery, the 
existence of a disputed factual element essential to his or her case with respect to 
which he or she bears the burden of proof. Where the record taken as a whole 
cannot lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, the motion for 
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HN4± Publication is defined as the distribution of copies of a work to the public by sale or 
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distribute copies to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public 
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H/V5±To perform or display a work publicly means: (1) to perform or display it at a place 
open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of 
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. 17 U.S.C.S. 5 
101 (1 ) . More Like This Headnote 
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HN6±Registration is a condition precedent to bringing an action for copyright 
infringement. 17 U.S.C.S. § 411(a). Failure to register a copyright before 
publication of the work may be cured, thus allowing the copyright owner to bring 
suit, by registration before or within five years of the first publication of the work, 
and constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright and of the facts stated in the 
certificate. 17 U.S.C.S. § 410(c). The work need not be published to be registered. 
17 U.S.C.S. 5 408 (a ) and (b) . More Like This Headnote 
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HN7±Remedies for copyright infringement are provided by § 504(a) of the Copyright Act, 
17 U.S.C.S. § 504(a). It makes the infringer liable for either (1) the copyright 
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by 
subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection 
(c ) . More Like This Headnote 
Copyright Law > Civil Infringement Actions > Remedies > Damages > Statutory Damages 
Copyright Law > Formalities > Deposit & Registration > Registration > General Overview ™J 
HN8±Statutory damages are not available to plaintiff for (1) any infringement of 
copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its 
registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication 
of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration 
is made within three months after the first publication of the work. 17 U.S.C.S. § 
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Copyright Law > Conveyances > Formalities > Signature Requirement 
HN10±Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act explicitly provides for the transfer of copyright 
ownership. It states: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by 
operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or 
memorandum of the transfer, is in a writing signed by the owner of the rights 
conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent. 17 U.S.C.S. 5 204 
(a)- More Like This Headnote 
COUNSEL: [*1] FOR RUSS MARSHALL, plaintiff: Barbara M. Cash, Southfield, ML 
FOR MUSIC HALL CENTER FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS, INCORPORATED, defendant: David 
M. Gaskin, Dahlberg, Mallender, Birmingham, ML 
JUDGES; John Corbett O'Meara, United States District Judge 
OPINIONBY: John Corbett O'Meara 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Plaintiff, Russ Marshall, is a professional photographer who, on September 1, 1993, gave the 
Graystone International Jazz Museum in Detroit one copy each of 37 photographs he had 
taken of "local and national jazz musicians and singers." n l Each of the donated photographs 
was inscribed on the back with the photographer's "inventory notations;" however, none of 
the pictures carried the copyright symbol or other notation of copyright. In the group was a 
photograph Plaintiff had taken in 1980 of Dizzy Gillespie, he asserts two prints of the 
photograph were made; one was donated to the museum and the second was kept for his 
own records. n2 In 1994 the Music Hall Center for the Performing Arts took over sponsorship 
of the Montreaux Detroit Jazz Festival and used, with the museum's consent, the 
plaintiff's [*2] Dizzy Gillespie photograph as the program's cover. n3 While there is some 
dispute over the number of programs printed, several thousand of them were distributed to 
concert goers from September 1-5, 1994. 
Footnotes 
n l Defendant's brief, exhibit 1. The deed of gift, "gift agreement," as signed by Plaintiff 
states: "I hereby give and deliver to the Graystone International Jazz Museum the property 
described herein." The property is described only as 37 11 x 14 inch black + white 
photographs." 
n2 Id. at 3. 
n3Id. 
End Footnotes 
On November 4, 1994 Plaintiff registered the photograph with the United States Copyright 
Office, offering September 1, 1994 as the date of first publication of the work. At issue 
between the parties is whether Mr. Marshall's interest in his photograph was copyright 
protected prior to its registration and if so, the damages to which he is entitled in light of 
Defendant's use of it. The parties agree that the photograph is a form of intellectual property 
subject to copyright, that the gift to the museum [*3] does not constitute "publication" of 
the photograph and that once the work was registered Mr. Marshall's interest in excluding 
others from publishing his work is protected. 
On March 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging copyright infringement as Count I. n4 
Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on August 28, 1995; Defendant filed its 
cross-motion for summary judgment as a response on September 28, 1995. Oral argument 
on the motions was heard on October 26, 1995, and the motions taken under advisement. 
The court now grants Plaintiff's motion for the reasons stated on the record and below. 
Footnotes 
n4 Count I I for conversion, a state law claim, was dismissed by court order on April 7, 1995. 
End Footnotes 
APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Standard of Review: Summary Judgment 
As interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, H/VI:Fsummary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there [ *4] is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pitts v. 
Miller Car Rental, 942 F.2d 1067, 1069 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Citing the 
trio of cases which defined the standards and burdens to be met by the parties in a motion 
for summary judgment, n5 the Court of Appeals posits H/V2:Fthe test for the grant of a motion 
for summary judgment as follows: 
the substantive law will identify which facts are material . . . only disputes over 
facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Thus, factual disputes which 
are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. To meet this standard, the 
moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other similar 
materials "negating" the opponents claim. The burden on the moving party may 
be discharged by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support 
the nonmoving party's case. Once the moving party meets this burden, the 
burden passes to the nonmoving party to establish, after an adequate 
opportunity for discovery, the existence of a disputed factual element [*5] 
essential to his or her case with respect to which he or she bears the burden of 
proof. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 
find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
Id. at 1069-70. 
Footnotes 
n5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202r 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986)f 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) and 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 
1348 (1986). 
End Footnotes-
B. Copyright Infringement 
In 1976 and again in 1988, the Copyright Act, Title 17 of the United States Code, was 
extensively modified. Under the current statute, federal copyright protection attaches to a 
work immediately upon its creation, and, for works published after March 1, 1989, is not 
forfeited by the creator's failure to attach notice of copyright to it. H/V3"?Section 401 of the 
Act, as modified, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General [*6] Provision.-Whenever a work protected under this title is 
published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, 
a notice of copyright. . . may be placed on publicly distributed copies from which 
the work can be visually perceived. 
17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (emphasis added). n6 
Footnotes 
n6 The statute formerly provided that notice of copyright "shall be placed on all publicly 
distributed copies." 
Effective March 1, 1989 the statute was further modified in order to conform with the Berne 
Convention. Because copyright notice is optional for works created after February 1989, the 
"innocent infringer" defense is available only for works for which there was public distribution 
prior to March 1, 1989. Bryce & Palazzola Architects & Assoc, v. A.M.E. Group, Inc., 865 F. 
Supp. 401, 404, (1994). 
End Footnotes 
The statute defines "^^'publication" as the 
the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering [*7] to distribute 
copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public 
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or 
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. n7 
Id. § 101. Although the "statutory definition under the current Act does not explicitly require 
that the 'distribution of copies' . . . be made under the authority of the copyright owner" it is 
"undoubtedly implied. Congress could not have intended that the various legal consequences 
of publication under the current Act would be triggered by the unauthorized act of an 
infringer or other stranger to the copyright." 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, The Law 
of Copyright, 5 4.04, at 4-20 (1995). 
Footnotes 
n7 This allows for personal use or display of the copyrighted work. 
End Footnotes 
As defined by the statute, H/V5,?to perform or display a work publicly means: 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside [*8] of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered; 
17 U.S.C. 6 101. 
Although according to current law, notice of copyright is not required for protection; HN6 
•registration is a condition precedent to bringing an action for copyright infringement. Id. § 
411(a). Failure to register a copyright before publication of the work may be "cured," thus 
allowing the copyright owner to bring suit, by registration "before or within five years of the 
first publication of the work" and constitutes "prima facie evidence of the copyright and of the 
facts stated in the certificate." Id. § 410(c). The work need not be published to be registered. 
Id. § 408(a) & (b), see Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 983 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1983). 
H/V7TRemedies for copyright infringement are provided by section 504(a) of the Act, which 
makes the infringer liable for either 
(1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the 
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or 
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). 
Statutory damages, n8 which are available to the copyright owner at any time before 
judgment, allow [ *9] the court to award plaintiff "a sum of not less than $ 500 or more than 
$ 20,000, as the court considers just" for each work infringed. Id. § 504(c)(1). For "willful" 
infringement, it is within the court's discretion to increase the statutory damages to $ 
100,000, alternatively if the court finds the infringer was "not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted infringement of copyright," the court may award 
statutory damages of not less than $ 200. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
Footnotes 
n8 The purpose of statutory damages is to allow relief for copyright infringement where the 
calculation of actual damages plus profits is too difficult or would be unfair. The owner's 
damages are usually considered the reasonable value the defendant would have given the 
plaintiff for the lawful use of the copyrighted work. 
End Footnotes 
'"^Statutory damages are not, however, available to the plaintiff for 
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the 
effective date of its registration; or 
(2) [*10] any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of 
the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration 
is made within three months after the first publication of the work. 
Id. § 412. HNgm¥\Nhere a plaintiff fails to register his copyrights before the infringement, 
statutory damages and attorney's fees are not available. Fitzgerald Publishing Co. Inc. v. 
Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (E.D. N.Y. 1987) (citing 17 U.S.C. 5 412 
(2)). 
07Section 204 of the Act explicitly provides for the transfer of copyright ownership: 
(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid 
unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is 
in writing a signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly 
authorized agent. 
17 U.S.C. 5 204(a). 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff is the creator and copyright owner of his 1980 photograph of Dizzy Gillespie. His gift 
to the museum of one print of the photograph as described on the "gift agreement" does not 
comport with the statute's requirements for the transfer of copyright ownership, as it does 
not license or [*11] otherwise convey any portion of the plaintiff's copyright to the 
museum. In making the gift, Mr. Marshall was not required to mark the donated print with 
the copyright symbol to protect his ownership. He owned the copyright as soon as the work 
was created, and his failure to mark or register the photograph before Defendant's 
infringement did not divest him of it. Defendant is incorrect as a matter of law in its assertion 
to the contrary. In addition, Defendant may not assert the "innocent infringer" defense, as 
publication occurred after March 1, 1989. 
Although the statute bars an action for infringement without registration, Mr. Marshall 
effectively "cured" that deficiency by registering the copyright "before or within five years of 
its first publication," as provided by the Act. He is therefore entitled to actual damages which 
can be attributed to the defendant's infringing activity. The "primary measure" for recovery 
of actual damages is "based upon the extent to which the market value of the copyrighted 
work, at the time of infringement, has been injured. . . . the plaintiff's damages may be said 
to equal the profits that the plaintiff might have accrued but for the defendant's [*12] 
infringement." 3 Nimmer § 14.02[A] at 14-10. 
However, because the copyright was not registered before the infringing activity, plaintiff is 
not entitled to statutory damages and/or attorney fees. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated on the record at oral argument and above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that Plaintiff's August 28, 1995 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's September 28, 1995 cross-motion for summary 
judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Pepe for 
determination of Plaintiff's actual damages consistent with this opinion. 
John Corbett O'Meara 
United States District Judge 
Dated: 11/2/95 
JUDGMENT 
This action came before the Court, Honorable John Corbett O'Meara, District Judge, 
presiding, and the issues having been duly heard and a decision having been duly rendered, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 
DATED: 11/2/95 
APPROVED: 
JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Amanda Weaver, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. DirectLink Media Group, LLC; and John Does I through X, whose true names are unknown, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20030947-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UT App 471; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 524 
December 16, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE 
OFFICIAL REPORTER. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Sandy Department. The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg. 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In a class action arising out of the sending and receipt of 
unsolicited e-mail, plaintiff recipient, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, 
appealed a decision of the Third District, Sandy Department (Utah), which dismissed her 
action against defendant corporation for lack of jurisdiction. 
OVERVIEW: The recipient filed a class action against the corporation because of an 
unsolicited e-mail sent by the company to the recipient and others. The trial court 
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court reversed and 
remanded. The court held that a company that sent or caused one unsolicited, 
commercial e-mail to be sent to a resident of Utah transacted business in Utah within the 
meaning of the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. The court also held 
that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case comported with the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
OUTCOME: The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
CORE TERMS: email, attenuated, transmission, nonresident, lack of personal jurisdiction, 
misgivings, trivial 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Standards Generally ^El 
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Jurisdictional Sources 1*J3 
HN1±An appellate court reviews a trial court's jurisdiction decision for 
correctness. More Like This Headnote 
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HN2±A company that sends or causes one unsolicited, commercial e-mail to be sent to a 
resident of Utah transacts business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-
arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. The exercise of jurisdiction in such a case 
comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. More Like This Headnote 
COUNSEL: Daniel Garriott, Denver C. Snuffer Jr., Sandy, and Jesse L Riddle, Draper, for 
Appellant. 
JUDGES: Norman H. Jackson, Judge. Gregory K. Orme, Judge, Russell W. Bench, Associate 




The district court dismissed Plaintiff Amanda Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction; 
Weaver appeals. We reverse and remand. 
H /v l?We review the trial court's jurisdiction decision for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. 
Curry, 1999 UT 50, P2r 980 P.2d 204. In all relevant ways, this case is factually identical to 
our recent case, Fenn v. MLeads Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah 
Adv. 37. Thus, Fenn controls this case. In Fenn, the court held that HN2:?a company that 
sends or causes one unsolicited, commercial email to be sent to a resident of Utah transacts 
business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code section 78-27-
24- See Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-24 (1998); Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at P30. The [*2] court 
also held that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case comports with the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; U.S. Const, amend. XIV. Thus, we hold that the trial 
court incorrectly dismissed Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we 
reverse the dismissal and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings, n l 
Footnotes 
n l Despite the concurrence's belatedly expressed misgivings, our understanding of the 
difference between a purposeful act and an attenuated circumstance is whether the act was 
intentional. It is clear in this case that the email was sent intentionally, and therefore 
purposefully, to Utah. Moreover, we will not second-guess the legislature's determination that 
this injury is far from trivial, but rather, serious enough to warrant a cause of action that 
awards attorney fees as well as statutory damages. 
End Footnotes 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
CONCURBY: Russell W. Bench 
CONCUR: 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge [*3] (concurring in the result): 
I agree that Fenn v. MLeads Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah Adv. 
37, controls the outcome of this case. But I concur only in result because of my misgivings 
about the holding in Fenn. 
I dissented in Fenn because I do not believe that a single email can vest Utah with personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant-sender where the plaintiff-recipient alleges no injury resulting 
from the transmission of the email. In order to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry, due process 
requires that a nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 
2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). This "requirement ensures that a defendant will not be 
haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of . . . 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L Ed. 2d 790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984)). 
It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented here: a single 
email message sent [ *4] to a lone Utah recipient. Here, as in Fenn, there is no allegation 
"that the email caused any reputational, economic, emotional, or physical 'injury.'" Fenn, 
2004 UT App 412 at P20. In both cases, the plaintiffs allege only statutory damages of ten 
dollars. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 (Supp. 2003). 
To craft its single email rule, the Fenn majority relied in part on Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 
1999 UT 50, 980 P.2d 204. In Starways, the Utah Supreme Court held that the nonresident 
defendants' alleged transmission of libelous facsimiles vested Utah with jurisdiction. Id. at P9. 
Although the Fenn majority recognized that the absence of alleged injury in Fenn 
distinguished it from Starways, the majority concluded that this distinction was unimportant. 
Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at PP20-21. However, I believe that Starways should prevent Utah 
from taking jurisdiction over cases where no injury is alleged. 
The single email rule established by Fenn therefore improperly ignores the "'quality and 
nature"' of the defendant's contact, vesting jurisdiction based solely on a single contact 
within Utah, however [*5] trivial. Starways, 1999 UT 50 at P8 (quoting International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)). Thus, contrary to 
the view of my colleagues, I believe that intentional contact alone is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations should 
play no role in our due process inquiry. 
Nonetheless, I recognize that Fenn is now controlling precedent. I therefore reluctantly 
concur in the result. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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RAYMOND WOOLFOLK v. ALBERT G. RUBIN 
CIVIL NO. N-88-266 (EBB) 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20964 
February 1, 1990, Decided 
February 2, 1990, Filed 
DISPOSITION: [*1] Plaintiff's motion for judgment of damages granted. 
JUDGES: ELLEN BREE BURNS, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. 
OPINIONBY: ELLEN BREE BURNS 
OPINION: RULING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF DAMAGES 
On November 13, 1989, summary judgment as to liability was entered against defendant, 
Albert G. Rubin. Presently pending before the court is plaintiffs motion for judgment of 
damages. Plaintiff moves for statutory damages of $ 1,000 in lieu of actual damages 
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1692k(a)(2)(A)f 
plus attorney's fees of $ 2,160 and costs of $ 120, for a total of $ 3,280. For the reasons set 
forth below, plaintiffs motion is granted. 
DISCUSSION 
With respect to plaintiffs claim for statutory damages, the civil liability section of the FDCPA 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to 
comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable 
to such person in an amount equal to the sum of — 
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such 
failure; 
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, [ *2] such 
additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $ 
1,000; 
* * * 
(3) . . . the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's 
fee as determined by the court. 
15 U.S.C. 5 1692k(a). 
Citing Emanuel v. American Credit Exchange, 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1989), defendant 
argues that plaintiff must show actual damages to recover up to the statutory amount of $ 
1,000. In Emanuel, the court stated: 
Emanuel did not plead nor prove that he suffered any specific loss, and thus he is 
not deserving of actual damages. Considering the nature of American Credit's 
noncompliance with the statute and the fact that its noncompliance was neither 
frequent, persistent nor intentional, we also think that Emanuel should not 
receive any "additional" damages, particularly since such damages are 
discretionary, and no actual damages have been demonstrated. 
Id. (citations omitted). This court does not interpret Emanuel to preclude an award of 
statutory damages in any case where no actual damages have been proven. 
Moreover, several courts have found that actual damages need not be proven before [*3] 
statutory damages can be awarded. See Baker v. G.C. Services Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 
(9th Cir. 1982); Traverso v. Sharinn, Civil No. N-88-446 (WWE) (D. Conn. December 5, 
1989); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 1988): Harvey v. 
United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D. Oregon 1981). 
In the instant action, the court awards the full $ 1,000 in statutory damages since the 
defendant, an attorney, violated the FDCPA not only by failing to disclose that a letter sent to 
the plaintiff was an attempt to collect a debt and that all information obtained would be used 
for that purpose, but also by threatening to sue without authority, intent or capability. 
With respect to plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees and costs, the court finds that, in view of 
plaintiff's attorney's expertise in consumer law, her request for fees in this case is 
reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is awarded $ 1,000 in statutory damages, $ 2,160 in 
attorney's fees, and $ 120 for costs, for a total of $ 3,280. 
SO ORDERED. 
ELLEN BREE BURNS, CHIEF JUDGE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
Dated [*4] at New Haven, Connecticut, this 1st day of February, 1990. 
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